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I. INTRODUCTION
Jill Peterson and Kevin Heinz got married in a Minnesota church
and made a video of the wedding party dancing down the aisle to
“Forever” by Chris Brown.1 A video of this very entertaining march
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Parchomovsky for invaluable contributions and encouragement. I further thank Prof. Tim Wu and
Prof. Kenneth Crews, Prof. Edward Lee, Dr. Shmuel Becher, and the participants of the SJDs
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Special thanks are also due to Ohad Lev-Aretz, Erez Aloni, Maayan Filmar, Luke Aneka and Nizan
Geslevich-Pakin for their useful remarks. I would also like to thank the ISEF Foundation for their
generosity and support, which made this project possible. The opinions addressed in this Article are
solely those of the author.
1. JK
Wedding
Entrance
Dance,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JK_Wedding_Entrance_Dance (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
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was uploaded to YouTube as the “JK Wedding Entrance Dance.”2
Assuming that neither the happy couple nor their friends obtained a
copyright license to use Brown’s song, it is somewhat befuddling that it
has been over eighteen months, in which more than 61 million users
have viewed this video, yet it has not been removed from YouTube. It is
even more puzzling given the fact that this video is one of myriad
examples of unauthorized uses of copyrighted content on user-generated
content platforms.
The emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon has challenged
existing copyright practice by offering users an opportunity to engage in
activities previously reserved for professionals only and to distribute
content to an inconceivable amount of people through User-Generated
Content (“UGC”) platforms.3
While users have utilized this
advancement to share many original works, UGC platforms are saturated
with infringing content, either in the form of derivative works or as pure
reproductions of copyrighted works.4 Nonetheless, and although
platforms and end-users are exposed to copyright infringement suits,
UGC platforms are remarkably prosperous in cyberspace.
Two developments in copyright practice, which have materialized
as a response to the challenges posed by the Web 2.0 era, have allowed
the outstanding success of UGC platforms. The first development,
which has been already recognized in legal commentary, is tolerated use.
Tolerated use occurs when a copyright owner knows about infringing
activity but does not act to halt it or seek to be compensated for it.5 This
Article claims that although tolerated use is fairly widespread in the
UGC context,6 it cannot, by itself, explain the undisturbed presence of
countless copyrighted works posted by users. The second advancement,
2. JK Wedding Entrance Dance, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=494JhLEiN0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
3. The term Web 2.0 refers to collaborative, user-generated content space, which uses the
Internet as a software platform. See Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, Design Patterns and Business
Models for the Next Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005),
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. UGC is often defined as content uploaded
and sometimes created by Internet users, rather than produced by the website itself. For a
comprehensive definition, see Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of
Copyright: Part one—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 870 (2008).
4. Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 846-60 (2009).
5. Prof. Tim Wu, coined the term “tolerated use.” Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 617, 619 (2008) [hereinafter Wu, Tolerated Use].
6. Id. See also Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1506 (2008) (arguing that informal copyright practices serve as significant gap-fillers in
copyright law and referring to a range of reasons that have allowed UGC to thrive, including
outright ratification of mass user practices).
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which I term “Second Level Agreements,” has yet to be analyzed in
depth by legal commentary, although it holds the key to the resolution of
the said puzzle.
Second Level Agreements are preemptive licenses granted by
copyright owners to platforms operators, with the purpose of ratifying
the mass usage of copyrighted content by their users. Under such
arrangements, copyright owners authorize the employment of particular
works by platforms’ users in return for royalties, company stakes, or a
share of advertising revenues. Many UGC networks, such as YouTube,
Myspace, and Yahoo, have chosen this course to shelter themselves from
secondary liability claims. The first Second Level Agreement was
concluded in 2006, when YouTube announced a video distribution and
revenue partnership with Warner Music Group.7
According to
YouTube’s press release, under the “first-of-its-kind arrangement,
YouTube users will be able to incorporate music from WMG’s recorded
music catalog into the videos they create and upload onto YouTube.”8
While licenses for the purpose of pure reproduction are common in
copyright practice,9 these agreements mark the first time in copyright
history that a user creates a derivative work pursuant to a license that
was not granted directly to her. Because the agreements are negotiated
and concluded between copyright holders and UGC platforms’ owners,
users end up employing copyrighted works under the terms of a license
they were neither a part of designing, nor were fully aware of its details.
Users can gather information as to the terms of these agreements only
from the few press releases and the media. Moreover, users are legally
bound only by the platforms’ terms of service, which do not reflect the
existence of Second Level Agreements.10 Therefore, while in practice
Second Level Agreements allow copyrighted materials posted by users
on UGC platforms to remain online, the agreements should have no legal
impact on the users’ legal status.
This Article analyzes in-depth a significant practice that has not
been recognized in legal scholarship. Their unique structure and the way
in which Second Level Agreements have developed within the relatively
7. Press Release, Warner Music Inc., Warner Music Group, Warner Music Group and
YouTube Announce Landmark Video Distribution and Revenue Partnership (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://investors.wmg.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=182480&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=906153.
8. Id.
9. For example, when a user purchases a track on iTunes, she is allowed to export, burn (if
applicable), or copy (if applicable) the sound recording solely for personal, noncommercial use. See
iTunes
Store
Terms
of
Service,
Section
10(b)(vii),
APPLE
INC.,
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
10. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
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short time of their existence have important consequences for the various
players in the copyright market. Accordingly, this study presents a
detailed description of the practice, while using YouTube, the pioneer
and exemplar of this phenomenon, as a case study to demonstrate the
significance of Second Level Agreements. The YouTube case reveals
two conflicting movements:
the first is a movement toward
standardization, and the second is a movement toward premium—as
opposed to amateur—content partnerships. Platforms’ operators and
copyright holders have worked to maximize efficiency and lower
transaction costs by using content identification and filtering
technologies, as well as standardizing Second Level Agreements’ terms.
While this should have allowed for more Second Level Agreements to
emerge, another development has occurred concurrently to trigger a
contradictory affect: advertisers have found that original and derivative
UGC is far less appropriate for commercials than premium content.11
Consequently, platforms’ operators began to search for new revenue
generators in the form of professionally produced content and the
importance of UGC in the licensing priority has diminished. 12
To conclude the doctrinal prong, this study maps out the sphere of
the Second Level Agreements practice. While video and audio sharing
platforms have widely embraced Second Level Agreements, other UGC
platforms, such as blogs, image-sharing, and fan fiction websites have
not. Several factors such as the ‘embed’ and ‘linking’ functions,
technological difficulties of identification, and the non-concentrated
nature of platforms operators and right holders are possible explanations
for this disparity.13
The Article also offers a normative assessment of the benefits and
shortcomings of the Second Level Agreements practice. Advantages
like better information consumption, greater expression production, and
broader infringement avoidance are juxtaposed against disadvantages
such as the opacity surrounding the agreements, their non-inclusiveness
and potential vulnerability, the lack of democratic ideals in this private
self governance tool, the use of identification technologies that may lead
to over-filtering, the advancement of a ‘clearance culture,’ and more.14
The prescriptive discussion commences by pointing to the legal and
practical implications of Second Level Agreements. Legal defenses for
11. Brad Stone, Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?_r=1.
12. Id.
13. See infra section V.C.
14. See infra section V.D.
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users, such as implied license and estoppel, are discussed to demonstrate
that Second Level Agreements bear legal significance for users
irrespective of their absence from the contractual relationship. Serving
as an industry norm, Second Level Agreements have ample importance
in the non-legal context as well. Derivatively, a normative assessment is
proposed, arguing that Second Level Agreements represent a desired
development of copyright practice, and offering some improvements to
augment the benefits of these pacts. The Article then carefully looks at
the future of Second Level Agreements while reviewing four potential
catalysts—the shift towards premium content, the Viacom v. Google
ruling,15 the move towards disintermediation, and the rise of noncommercial licensing system.
The remainder of this Article consists of seven parts. Part II
discusses the emergence of the Web 2.0 age, and offers a useful
classification of UGC content. Part III demonstrates the application of
current copyright law to UGC platforms by reviewing theories of
secondary liability and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
(“DMCA”) provisions. Part IV considers the practice of tolerated use
and its contribution to UGC platforms’ success and users’ ability to
generate derivative content. Second Level Agreements are described
and studied thoroughly in Part V. Part VI offers a normative
contribution and careful prediction of the future of Second Level
Agreements and copyright in the digital realm. A conclusion follows in
Part VII.
II. THE WEB 2.0 ERA AND THE INCEPTION OF UGC
The advancements in the Internet’s capabilities are usually referred
to as “Web 1.0,” “Web 2.0,” and “Web 3.0.”16 Under the Web 1.0 stage,
the Web functioned as a read-only medium through numerous ‘static’
websites. The following phase—Web 2.0—was defined as an “amalgam
of ‘participatory Web’ applications,” which turned erstwhile passive end
users into active producers by allowing them to generate and share
content of all types.17 The decentralization of the Web became apparent
through a move from publishing to participation, which empowered the
15. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
16. Web 3.0 (or “Semantic Web”) is a future phrase, which is expected to be defined by the
organization and classification of data collected from users’ online activities. See Tanya M. Woods,
Working Towards Spontaneous Copyright Licensing: A Simple Solution for a Complex Problem, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1141, 1160 (2009).
17. Eugene C. Kim, Note, YouTube: Testing the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139 (2007).
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Internet to operate as a platform rather than a mere data conduit.18 The
Web 2.0 era has progressively shifted Internet business models into
UGC.19 UGC is often defined as content uploaded and sometimes
created by Internet users, rather than produced by the website itself.20
Websites providing services like blogs, wikis, photo sharing, music
sharing, and video sharing have become widespread. Virtual worlds, fan
fiction websites, and social networking sites (e.g., Myspace21 and
Facebook22) have gained special popularity.23 Some UGC is also
available on websites owned by traditional content companies, where
people provide unprofessional news reports, photos, and videos with no
compensation.24
To comprehend the effect that UGC has had on the copyright
world, one must first differentiate between divergent types of UGC. The
first kind is “Pure UGC,” which refers to original content created by
users. Many blogs, for example, consist of original content created by
the bloggers posting it on their blog. Another common example is
original music posted by amateur artists on MySpace, YouTube, and
other websites. Because pure content is original, and uploading it
neither infringes nor violates any copyright ban, copyright law intends to
encourage the production of such UGC.
The second type of UGC includes derivative content, which is
created from adaptations of preexisting works. This group incorporates
UGC that adds or alters copyrighted works, but does not qualify as fair
use. “Fanvids”—user-made videos that edit together music and clips
from television shows or movies—are a common example for such a
use.25 Another illustration can be found in a video of a family event with

18. TERRY FLEW, NEW MEDIA 13 (2005).
19. UGC is called “user-created content” overseas. See Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use
& Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363
(2009).
20. Hetcher, supra note 3, at 870.
21. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com.
22. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com.
23. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 364.
24. E.g., CNN ireport, CNN, iReport.com. UGC’s ability to displace traditional media has
become known as “crowdsourcing”—“a method for using the public, typically via the Internet, to
supply what employees and experts once did.” Sarah Kershaw, A Different Way to Pay for the News
You Want, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/weekinreview/
24kershaw.html; Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html.
25. Casey Fiesler, Everything I need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How Existing Social
Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 729, 733 (2008).
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copyrighted music in the background.26 Unless the copyright owner
granted permission, derivative UGC constitutes copyright infringement.
The third category encompasses UGC, which employs preexisting
works but does not amount to infringement under some limitation or
exemption to the author’s exclusive right. An example for such use can
be found in the case of Corey Vidal. Vidal, an online video amateur
provider, posted on YouTube an Acapella tribute to film composer John
Williams.27 The video displayed a four part harmony, in which the saga
of the original Star Wars trilogy is recapped to a medley of Williams’
celebrated scores. Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the fair
use defense, the video was considered by many as a clear case of fair
use.28 Thus, when YouTube took it down following a DMCA notice,
wide criticism ensued until it was restored.29
The fourth, and final, UGC classification consists of pure
reproductions, such as time-shift recordings of popular TV shows, music
sound recording and videos, etc.30 This kind of content is consensually
regarded as copyright infringement.
It is hard to determine the exact percentage of every UGC type
because the percentage of infringing UGC currently uploaded to
platforms is unknown and probably fluctuates from one site to another.
A 2007 study found that less than six percent of all views on YouTube,
the most popular UGC video site, were of copyrighted material.31 By

26. For example, video clip featuring a slideshow of a couple’s wedding day, in which Five
for Fighting’s song—100 Years—used as a background: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ctQtU9jUZQ4&feature=fvw (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). See also JK Wedding Entrance Dance,
supra note 2.
27. Star
Wars
(John
Williams
is
the
Man),
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lk5_OSsawz4.
28. E.g., Greg Sandoval, YouTube Users Caught in Warner Music Spat, CNET NEWS (Jan. 27,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html; Joe Windish, A Warner Music/Corey
Vidal Take Down Tale, The Moderate Voice (Jan. 27, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/25981/awarner-musiccorey-vidal-take-down-tale/; Julian Sanchez, EFF Seeks Mashup Makers to Fight
YouTube
Filtering,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Feb.
3,
2009),
http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/02/eff-seeks-mashup-makers-to-fight-youtubefiltering.ars.
29. On February 24, 2009, the original video returned after Vidal fought Warner’s claim,
citing the video as being protected under fair use. Corey Vidal, COREY VIDAL, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corey_Vidal (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
30. For this reason, some commentators do not include the last type under the definition of
UGC, because it resembles more of a peer-to-peer distribution than UGC. See, e.g., Lee, supra note
6, at 1506. For a different approach, see Kurt Hunt, Copyright and Youtube: Pirate’s Playground
or Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 202 (2007), and Gervais, supra
note 4, at 860.
31. Bri Holt, Heidi R. Lynn & Michael Sowers, Analysis of Copyrighted Videos on
YouTube.com,
VIDMETER.COM
(2007),
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examining a random sample of online videos, another study learned that
twelve percent of the videos posted on YouTube constituted
infringement of copyrighted works.32 Either way it is safe to state that
while many original expressions are distributed using UGC platforms, a
considerable amount of uploaded UGC infringes copyrights.
To address this issue and to demonstrate the liability claims that
lurk for UGC platforms and users, the next section reviews the
application of copyright law to UGC. The sketched legal frame
underscores the riddle—how a vast amount of infringing UGC can
reside on UGC platforms without being removed, and how UGC
platforms continue to prosper without powerful copyright owners rising
up against them in the same way they fought erstwhile facilitators of
online infringement.
III. APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT
Some forms of UGC constitute clear copyright infringement. Yet,
locating end-users who infringe copyrighted works can be both difficult
and expensive.33 Thus, copyright owners have attempted to accumulate
their legal claims by bringing suits for secondary liability against
operators of platforms that facilitate copyright violations.34 In the
copyright context, therefore, the issues brought up by the rise of UGC
platforms relate mainly to secondary liability. The following review
delineates the secondary liability regime and its applicability in the case
of UGC platforms.
A.

Secondary Liability

For decades copyright litigation centered on direct infringement, as
well as on theories of indirect copyright infringement, although the
Copyright Act does not expressly provide for secondary liability.35 The

http://uploadi.www.ris.org/editor/1176893367vidmeter_copyright_report.pdf.http://www.vidmeter.c
om/i/vcopyrightidmeter__report.pdf. However, the methodology of this study was criticized
because it considers UGC as not copyrighted unless a DMCA take-down notice was issued. See
Sawyer, supra note 19, at 364.
32. YouTube
Statistics,
DIGITAL
ETHNOGRAPHY
(2008),
available
at
http://ksudigg.wetpaint.com/page/YouTube+Statistics (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
33. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the DMCA: A
Safe-Harbor from Copyright Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8
(2007).
34. Id.
35. Greg Jansen, Whose Burden is it Anyway? Addressing the Needs of Content Owners in
DMCA Safe Harbors, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 157 (2010).
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latter arose from judicial interpretation of the Copyright Act, and came
to include contributory infringement and vicarious infringement.36
Contributory infringement requires a defendant to have knowledge of
the infringing material and to have induced, caused, or materially
contributed to the infringing conduct.37 Courts find vicarious liability
when the defendant had the right and ability to control the direct
infringer and received a financial benefit from the direct infringement.38
With the rise of products and services that enabled users to infringe on
copyright more easily, copyright owners attempted to prevent
infringement at the offering of the products and services facilitating such
infringement. The most prominent example is the legal battle over the
VCR in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.39
Contributory liability may be especially relevant to UGC platforms,
which risk potential liability based on the theory of being facilitators of
direct infringements.40 Indeed, most UGC platforms are not used only
for infringing purposes, thus according to the Supreme Court’s holding
in Sony, secondary liability should not arise.41 Still, UGC platforms host
a great amount of user-uploaded materials that often directly infringe a
copyright. Some argue that notifications sent by copyright owners to
UGC websites, alleging copyright infringement, could establish
“knowledge” on the part of the platform’s owner, thereby subjecting it to
potential contributory liability.42 Moreover, the Sony Court held that in
an ongoing relationship, the alleged secondary infringer is in a position
to control the use of the copyrighted works by the primary infringer.43
Because most UGC platforms require users to create an account to
upload materials, it can be argued that they maintain ongoing
relationships with their users, which may expose them to secondary
liability as well. UGC platforms may also be found vicariously liable if
they receive a direct financial benefit for infringing activities, such as
advertisement revenue.

36. Lisa Veasman, ‘Piggy Backing’ on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0
Mashups, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 319 (2008).
37. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
38. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (citing
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)).
39. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
40. Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 33, at 17.
41. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 437.
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The DMCA Safe Harbors and the Liability of OSPs

The DMCA established safe harbors to protect online service
providers (OSPs) from monetary liability for material that is transmitted
over networks,44 cached on a server,45 residing on systems or networks at
the direction of users,46 or linking users to an online location containing
infringing material or infringing activity, by deploying information
location tools.47 To qualify for the safe harbor protection, an OSP must
fall under one of the aforementioned categories, and demonstrate the
adoption and implementation of certain policies. First, an OSP is
obligated to adopt and reasonably implement a stated policy “for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat
infringers.”48 Second, an OSP must also not interfere with “standard
technical measures” employed by copyright owners to identify
infringing content.49 Additional criteria for qualifying for the DMCA’s
safe harbor status are set forth in sections 512(c)(1) and 512(i), as each
safe harbor has separate statutory requirements limiting its applicability.
Of the four DMCA safe harbors, section 512(c), which safeguards
OSPs who have infringing content “Residing on Systems or Networks at
Discretion of Users,” is at the center of attention in the UGC context.
Many UGC websites such as YouTube, Myspace, Dailymotion,50
Facebook, Flickr,51 and Vimeo52 qualify under section 512(c) to be
considered hosts of such content. Still, these platforms would have to
comply with the additional requisites in the section to enjoy the safe
harbor status, which then places the burden of identifying infringing
works squarely on copyright owners.53 First, they are required to have
no actual or constructive knowledge that infringing content is on their
system.54 If an OSP becomes aware of any infringing activity, it must

44. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
45. Id. § 512(b).
46. Id. § 512(c).
47. Id. § 512(d).
48. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A).
49. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B), § 512(i)(2).
50. DAILY MOTION, http://www.dailymotion.com/us.
51. FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com.
52. VIMEO, http://vimeo.com.
53. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA
notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the
potentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners
of the copyright.”).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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immediately remove or disable access to the material.55 Moreover, an
OSP cannot gain a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity.56
A designated agent, whose contact information ought to be registered
with the United Stated Copyright Office and accessible to the public,
must be available to “receive notifications of claimed infringement.”57
Upon encountering an allegedly infringing use, the copyright owner
would locate the platform’s designated agent and send her a “written
communication.”58 When an OSP receives such notification, it is
required to follow the procedure set forth in section 512(c)(3)—to
“respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that
is claimed to be infringing.”59 Failure to comply would cause the OSP
to lose its safe harbor status, and enable the copyright owner to request a
subpoena to identify the alleged infringer.60
Two of the most recent cases to discuss the safe harbors provided
by section 512(c) involved a video-upload site—Veoh, which was
claimed to be contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright
infringement in videos uploaded to its servers.61 In IO Group. Inc. v.
Veoh Networks. Inc., the Court held that when a video-sharing website
could not locate infringing materials using simple text searches, the
platform does not have a practical ability to control the infringing
activity as content could be mislabeled.62 Moreover, the decision
indicates that any actual or apparent knowledge of infringement may be
mitigated if the platform expeditiously removes or disables access to
infringing material.63 Under the court’s interpretation, an OSP may
utilize an automated process to facilitate a third party’s request to upload
content without losing safe-harbor protections.64
Another case against Veoh was decided in September 2009. In
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., Judge Matz of the
Central District of California issued a summary judgment in favor of
Veoh, holding that it had made reasonable efforts to follow section
55. Id.
56. Id. §512(c).
57. Id. §512(c)(2). Contact information includes the agent’s name, address, phone number, email address, and any other information that the Register of Copyright deems appropriate.
58. Id. § 512(c)(3).
59. Id. § 512(c)(3).
60. Id. § 512(h).
61. IO Grp. Inc. v. Veoh Networks. Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
62. See IO Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
63. Id. at 1149.
64. Id. at 1147-48.
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512(c) of the DMCA.65 The court rejected UMG’s arguments as to the
implied knowledge of infringement imputed to Veoh, and found that
Veoh lacked the right and ability to control infringements despite its
technological control over the site.66 Specifically, the court noted that
Veoh properly complied with the notice-and-takedown procedure
expeditiously,67 and even implemented standard content filtering
software, something it was not specifically required to do by law.68
An appeal filed by UMG was recently rejected by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.69 The court stated that copyright holders
are better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service
providers like Veoh,70 and that § 512(m) of the DMCA did not impose
investigative obligations on service providers.71 Furthermore, a service
provider will be deprived of its safe harbor immunity only if it has
specific knowledge of infringing content on its site and fails to take
down that content.72 General knowledge that some infringing content
has been posted is insufficient for that matter.73 Notably, the court held
that right holders can only rely upon a valid DMCA takedown
notification to show specific knowledge of infringing material.74
Another recent decision to analyze UGC platforms’ status under the
DMCA is Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.75 The $1 billion
lawsuit, which was filed by Viacom in March 2007, accused YouTube
of widespread and willful infringement of Viacom’s movies, TV shows,
and other content, after YouTube knowingly allowed clips from
Viacom-owned programs to run, although they were illegally posted.76
YouTube maintained that while it was aware of copyrighted content
being uploaded to YouTube, as long as it proactively acted to remove
the infringing materials on their own or following the receipt of a
DMCA takedown notice from Viacom, YouTube has complied with the

65. See UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
66. Id. at 1112.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (9th Cir.
2011).
70. Id. at 1010.
71. Id. at 1015.
72. Id. at 1010.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1010-12.
75. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
76. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and
Demand for Jury Trial, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL 2062868
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008).
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DMCA requirements, and thus was shielded under a safe harbor status.77
U.S. District Court Judge Louis Stanton sided with YouTube, delivering
a summary judgment that essentially endorses current practices. The
court held that while YouTube certainly knew copyrighted content had
been posted on its site, general awareness of infringement was not
tantamount to “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of
individual items.”78 The court went on to say that because YouTube
promptly removed the copyrighted materials upon receiving a notice
from Viacom, YouTube was protected from liability under the DMCA.79
Calling the decision “fundamentally flawed,” Viacom appealed the
decision recently, so the last word is yet to be told. 80
Given that UGC involves many cases of copyright infringement,
one would have expected copyright owners to rise up against UGC
platforms in the same way they opposed previous facilitators of online
infringing activity. Nonetheless, the Web 2.0 era was not accompanied
by a tidal wave of major lawsuits. While several lawsuits have been
brought against UGC platforms, it appears that the previous resort to
litigation was somewhat enfeebled by the materialization of UGC
platforms, which instead stimulated two developments of copyright
practice—tolerated use and Second Level Agreements.
IV. TOLERATED USE
The prior discussion highlighted UGC dual complexion. On the
one hand, UGC platforms follow the constitutional ambition to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”81 by enabling free speech and
spurring expression. On the other hand, UGC raises many copyright
issues, such as originality, ownership, secondary liability, copyright
infringements, fair use, and over-filtering of desired expression. Within
this duality, UGC platforms keep operating successfully all over the
Internet. This prosperity is not self-explanatory if one is mindful of the
extensive infringement that constantly takes place on these platforms.82

77. Defendants’ Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No 1:07-cv-02103, 2008 WL 2260018 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008).
78. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d. at 519.
79. Id. at 528.
80. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 2010 WL
5066007 (Dec. 3, 2010) (No. 10-3270).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining legislative branch’s role regarding copyright and
patent).
82. Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 NO. 1 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 8 (2009).
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A possible explanation that was offered by legal scholarship is ‘tolerated
use’—“infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright
owner may be aware, yet does nothing about.”83 This informal practice
may be grounded in a copyright owner’s laziness, expansive
enforcement costs, a desire to create goodwill, or a strategic decision to
enjoy the benefit of the unauthorized use.84
Tolerated use is notably present in daily UGC practice.85 Even
though many users freely use the copyrighted works of others without
prior permission and beyond the conventional understandings of fair use,
sometimes copyright holders do not seem to be particularly concerned
with such uses, and sometimes even express their informal approval.86
Fan fiction websites, where users make derivative works of popular
copyrighted works and share them online, are a good example of
tolerated use. To demonstrate, look at the “Leaky Cauldron,” an allpurpose site for the Harry Potter enthusiasts.87 The site hosts, among
other offerings, a comprehensive Potter news archive, images, videos,
fan art galleries, downloadable widgets, a chat room, discussion forum,
and various essay projects. As Professor Tim Wu puts it, the “Leaky
Cauldron” represents “an orgy of copyright infringement.”88
Surprisingly however, not only has the fan fiction site fully operated for
several years now, but J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter
books, has publicly referred to it as “my favorite fan site” and “a
wonderfully well-designed mine of accurate information on all things
Harry Potter” that “attracts a lot of knowledgeable and entertaining
debate.”89
Tolerated use is also evident in popular user-created, pseudo-movie
trailers,90 such as “The Evil Pinocchio,” a short trailer recasting

83. Wu, Tolerated Use, supra note 5.
84. Id. at 619.
85. Steven Hetcher briefly argues that so-called “cut-and-paste” creative works, as long as
non-commercial, are to be tolerated by the entertainment industry. Steven Hetcher, User-Generated
Content and the Future of Copyright: Part two—Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 841 (2008).
86. Lee, supra note 6, at 1461.
87. THE LEAKY CALDRON, http://www.the-leaky-cauldron.org.
88. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use: The Copyright Problem, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2007),
http://www.slate.com/id/2175730/entry/2175731/.
89. A Brief (Believe It Or Not) History of The Leaky Cauldron, THE LEAKY CALDRON,
http://www.the-leaky-cauldron.org/info/siteinfo (last visited Nov. 18 2011). Moreover, even though
fan fiction has existed on the Internet for years, no copyright holder has ever challenged it to a
judgment in court. See Lee, supra note 6, at 1515.
90. Lee, supra note 6, at 1515.
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Pinocchio into an evil creature that wishes to destroy the world.91
Photos and videos documenting trips to Disneyland or Universal
Orlando Resort provide an additional example of tolerated use, as many
of them constitute copyright infringement. Nonetheless, Disney and
Universal have neither a stated policy against nor a formal approval for
such uploads, so many vacation photos and videos can be found online.92
By its nature, tolerated use is vulnerable as it may instantly turn
into a licensing relationship or liability battle. Because the user has no
costs to bear under this practice, she has no incentive to turn this statusquo into one of the other legal relationship forms. Hence, it is
predominantly the copyright owner who determines the duration of the
use, and a possible move into either licensing or liability courses.
While tolerated use is clearly present in copyright practice, it is not
sufficient to explain the current state of UGC. Many copyright holders
do not tolerate infringing usage, and exercise their right to ask for its
removal pursuant to the DMCA.93 Although users can send a counter
notification under the DMCA if they believe that the material has been
wrongly removed,94 many of them are either not aware of this right95 or
are not willing to take the risk of litigating a copyright lawsuit with an
anticipated expenditure of $400,000 in litigation costs.96 This intensifies
the enigma—even though counter notifications are not very common,
and tolerated use is not ubiquitous, UGC platforms are thriving
notwithstanding the vast amount of infringing content they host. A
suggested key to this puzzle is the practice of Second Level Agreements.

91. The Evil Pinocchio Trailer, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZBjtYkl0vE
(May 24, 2006).
92. Jason Cochran, Legal limbo: Disney could go after you for posting vacation videos online,
WALLET POP (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.walletpop.com/blog/2010/01/19/legal-limbo-disneycould-go-after-you-for-posting-vacation-vide/5 (“It’s tough to get an exact number of vacation
videos already online, but YouTube a search for ‘Disney World vacation’ pulls about 67,500 hits,
while individual attractions got smaller numbers: It’s a Small World claims 4,230 and Splash
Mountain offers 2,160.”).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
94. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
95. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006) (showing that minimal evidence of counternotices and
putback has been found).
96. According to Intellectual Property Law Institute, a survey of the average costs of
copyright litigation is $400,000. See MICHAEL L. LOVITZ, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
LITIGATING TRADEMARK, DOMAIN NAME & UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, STRATEGIES FOR
FUNDING IP LITIGATION: INSURANCE AND OTHER AVENUES 1 (2006).
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V. SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS
A.

Definition and Background

A Second Level Agreement can be defined as a preemptive license
obtained by UGC platforms owners in order to ratify the mass usage of
copyrighted content by their users. A copyright owner authorizes the
use of specified works by the platform’s users in return for royalties,
company stakes, or ad revenue share. While a First Level Agreement
involves the copyright owner on the one hand and the user on the other,
Second Level Agreements are negotiated and executed by copyright
owners and platform operators. In other words, Second Level
Agreements authorize unidentified uses of copyrighted content by users
in UGC platforms.
The practice of Second Level Agreements has developed within the
relatively short time of its existence. The first agreements were
negotiated individually and represented a specific solution for UGC
copyright infringements.
Any information as to the financial
arrangements, the agreed enforcement course, and the place of UGC in
these pacts, could be obtained solely from the few press releases and the
media. As time went by, the agreements became more standardized, and
were usually based on identification technologies that platforms began to
employ.97 Thanks to such technologies, copyright owners can now
identify their works and choose to block, track, or monetize them.98
When a copyright holder takes the blocking path, the alleged infringing
content will be immediately removed. Under a monetization policy, the
unauthorized use will remain available on the website, and ads will
appear in conjunction with the content. The tracking option acts as an
intervening or ancillary phase, which enables the owner of the copyright
to follow statistics about her work before deciding on or along with
blocking or monetizing.
Second Level Agreements represent a new phenomenon in
copyright practice. Throughout the history of copyright, a provider of
copyrighted content—as opposed to a passive consumer—has always
operated under some agreement to which she was a party. At first, the
author who offered the work negotiated the terms of the granted license
with the user. Later, intermediaries emerged, acting as providers of

97. YouTube was the first to offer this multi-choice regime, but many UGC platforms have
followed suit. See Block, Monetize, or Track Viewing Metrics—It’s Automated, and It’s Free,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
98. Id.
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content themselves, and accordingly enjoyed the privity of contract with
both the end user and copyright owner.99 Because the role of
intermediaries is based on economies of scale, they could not have
effectively interceded when the user is itself a provider of content, and
especially when derivative use is involved. In such case, the user’s
employment of a copyrighted work usually requires a deviation from
standard licensing terms. Without a valid defense, such as fair use, the
user-provider must have individually negotiated the terms of her license
with the copyright owner to lawfully use the copyrighted work. Because
individual negotiations between users-providers and copyright holders
entail high transaction costs and often involve unequal bargaining
power, they cannot be expected to enable mass creation of content by
users.
Nevertheless, the Web 2.0 era and the dawn of UGC have enabled,
for the first time, a group of creative users to enjoy and potentially
utilize economies of scale. UGC platforms allow creative users to
become providers of content, which is distributed for free and in great
numbers through the platforms’ facilities. In this sense, UGC represents
not only a potential for mass copyright infringement but also a prospect
of mass creation. While mass infringement has led to the development
of secondary liability in copyright law, no equivalent legal doctrine was
introduced to capture the promise of mass creation—that is, not until
recently. Recently, amid concerns about the effect of secondary liability
on the operation of platforms, and a desire to unlock the vast marketing
potential on the rights holders’ end, Second Level Agreements were
born. By de-facto allowing mass production by users, Second Level
Agreements act as the missing facilitator of lawful mass creation.
The first to employ Second Level Agreements as a business model
was YouTube, which has entered several contracts in the United States
and worldwide for authorizing the use of copyrighted works by its
users.100 While YouTube is the undeniable pioneer of the Second Level

99. Wu named it a “gatekeeping regime.” Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
679, 711 (2003) (“The gatekeepers were book publishers at first; later gatekeepers included record
manufacturers, film studios, and others who produced works on a mass scale. Their role resembled
that of doctors with respect to prescription drugs—they prevented evasion of the law by blocking
the opportunity to buy an infringing product in the first place.”).
100. For a list of YouTube’s U.S. deals, see infra notes 119, 129 and accompanying text.
YouTube has also reached licensing agreements with copyright owners all over the world, e.g., the
Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC), see Tomohisa Takei,
JASRAC-protected Songs Becomes Available on YouTube, TECH-ON (Oct. 24, 2008),
http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/english/NEWS_EN/20081024/160039/; SBS Broadcasting Group (SBS
Netherlands), see Editors’ Comment, Content Deals with SBS and UMG Widens Reach YouTube,
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Agreements practice, other UGC platforms signed similar licensing
deals. Yahoo! entered a Second Level Agreement with Sony BMG in
2007.101 The Social networking site, MySpace, stroke a comparable deal
with Sony BMG in 2007,102 and with Viacom-owned MTV Networks in
2008.103 Another social networking site, imeem, which was shut down
after MySpace acquired it in December 2009,104 entered content deals
with Warner Music Group,105 Sony BMG,106 EMI,107 and Universal
Music Group.108 Dailymotion, a video sharing service website based in
France, has also entered a series of revenue-sharing partnerships with
French and international content owners. Among its content partners are
the SPPF (Société Civile des Producteurs de Phonogrammes en
France),109 Warner Music,110 EMI,111 and Universal Music Group.112 In

SEARCHCOWBOYS.COM (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.searchcowboys.com/socialmedia/1050;
Britain Channel 4, see Mark Sweney, YouTube Signs Landmark Deal to Screen Channel 4 Shows,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct.15, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/15/youtube-channel-4google-deal; Irish Music Rights Organisation (Imro) and the Mechanical Copyright Protection
Society Ireland (MCPSI), see Mark Tighe, Musicians to Get a Cut from YouTube, TIMES ONLINE
(Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article7078948.ece; and the
French broadcaster Lagardère Active, see Ruth Bender, YouTube Signs Online Video Agreement,
SMART MONEY (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.smartmoney.com/news/on/?story=ON-20100412000264.
101. Barry Levine, Yahoo and Sony BMG Team on User-Generated Content, NEWS FACTOR
(Nov. 22, 2007), http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=12300BAYD9TL.
102. Yinka Adegoke, MySpace in Ad-supported Music Deal with Sony BMG, REUTERS UK
(Oct. 16, 2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKWNAS648120071016.
103. Steve O’Hear, MTV and MySpace Partner to Monetize Pirated Content, ZD NET (Nov. 3,
2008), http://blogs.zdnet.com/social/?p=602&tag=col1;post-602#more-602.
104. See imeem, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imeem.
105. Warner Music drops Imeem suit, forms partnership, REUTERS (July 12, 2007),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1226729920070712.
106. Press Release, Sony Music, Imeem Announces Content Agreement with Sony BMg
Music Entertainment (Sept. 28, 2007), http://press.sonymusic.com/2007/09/28/imeem-announcescontent-agreement-with-sony-bmg-music-entertainment/(http://www.sonymusic.com/posts/50imeem-announces-content-agreement-with-sony-bmg-music-entertainment).
107. Erick Schonfeld, Imeem Adds EMI to Its Stable, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 27, 2007),
http://techcrunch.com/2007/10/29/imeem-adds-emi-to-its-stable/.
108. Press Release, SMP, imeem Strikes Deal with Universal Music Group (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.socialmediaportal.com/PressReleases/2007/12/imeem-Strikes-Deal-withUNIVERSALMUSIC-GROUP.aspx.
109. A one-year “experimental agreement,” signed in December 2006, where the SPPF acts
directly with Dailymotion on behalf of all its users. See Jondet Nicolas, The Silver Lining in
Dailymotion’s Copyright Cloud, JURISCOM.NET (Apr. 19, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134807.
110. Press Release, Warner News, Warner Music Group and Dailymotion Announce Video
Content
Partnership
(Mar.
5,
2010),
http://www.wmg.com/newsdetails/id/8a0af8122718229f01272fda125d0f97.
111. EMI Music and Dailymotion Announce a Global Music Video Partnership, DAILYMOTION
BLOG
(Feb.
11,
2010),
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October 2007, Dailymotion signed additional revenue-sharing deals with
Turner Broadcasting Europe (a subsidiary of Time Warner) and USPA
(L’Union Syndicale de la Production Audiovisuelle), which represents
producers of television shows.113
B.

YouTube’s Content Partnerships as a Case Study

YouTube was initiated in February 2005, when three ex-PayPal
employees were looking for a way to easily share videos from a dinner
party with a small circle of friends.114 “When we registered the
YouTube domain on February 14, 2005, we set out to create a place
where anyone with a video camera and an Internet connection could
share a story with the world,” Chad Hurley, YouTube’s co-founder and
current CEO, wrote on the company’s blog a few months ago.115
YouTube grew at an astounding rate as users kept uploading personal
videos to share with friends. In November 2006, within a year of its
launch, YouTube was purchased by Google Inc. for $1.65 billion in
stock.116 Today, YouTube is the world’s largest repository for video
clips on the Internet, with over 48 hours of video uploaded to YouTube
every 60 seconds117 and hundreds of millions of videos watched every
day.118 YouTube’s popularity in its first years was mainly due to the
copyrighted material users uploaded to the site. Because the site’s
acquisition by Google provided copyright holders a deep pocket to
target, some of them, led by Viacom, which sued the site for more than
$1 billion, started suing YouTube for copyright infringement.119
Attempting to avoid lawsuits and to make YouTube a better source for

http://blog.dailymotion.com/index.php/page/2/http://blog.dailymotion.com/en/index.php/2010/02/11
/emi-music-and-dailymotion-announce-a-global-music-video-partnership/.
112. Jondet, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. Ernie Smith, 20 Highlights From YouTube’s First Five Years, AOL NEWS (Feb. 17,
2010), http://www.aolnews.com/tech/article/20-highlights-from-youtubes-first-five-years/19362101.
115. Chad Hurley, YouTube & the Online Video Revolution, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;)
THE
OFFICIAL
YOUTUBE
BLOG
(Feb.
14,
2010),
http://youtubeglobal.blogspot.com/2010/02/youtube-online-video-revolution.html.
116. Paul R. La Monica, Google to buy YouTube for $1.65 Billion, CNN MONEY (Oct. 9, 2006,
5:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/googleyoutube_deal/index.htm?cnn=yes.
117. Thanks, YouTube community, for two BIG gifts on our sixth birthday!, BROADCASTING
OURSELVES ;) THE OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG
(May. 25, 2011), http://youtubeglobal.blogspot.com/2011/05/thanks-youtube-community-for-two-big.html.
118. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
119. Don Reisinger, In just five years, YouTube became the go-to video site, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/02/youtube-fifth-birthday.html.
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profit, Google has entered into content partnerships with various music
and entertainment companies.
The first Second Level Agreement took place in 2006, when
YouTube announced a video distribution and revenue partnership with
Warner Music Group.120 According to YouTube’s press release, under
the “first-of-its-kind arrangement, YouTube users will be able to
incorporate music from WMG’s recorded music catalog into the videos
they create and upload onto YouTube.”121 Less than a month later,
YouTube formed similar arrangements with Sony BMG Music
Entertainment,122 Vivendi’s Universal Music Group,123 and CBS
Corporation.124 After signing another agreement with EMI on May
2007, YouTube succeeded in licensing content from all four major
music conglomerates in the United States.125 Additional pacts were
made with the NBA,126 Chelsea Football Club,127 Sony Pictures,
Lionstage, Starz,128 and more.129
The first set of Second Level Agreements involved months of
negotiations, and focused by and large on user uploaded content
(original materials, derivative works and reproductions). The press
release following the first YouTube-Warner pact emphasized the role of
users and their benefits under the new arrangement. The same tendency
was noticeable in the following agreement with Universal Music Group:

120. Press Release, supra note 7.
121. Id.
122. Press Release, YouTube, Sony BMG Music Entertainment Signs Content License
Agreement with YouTube (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/sony-bmgmusic-entertainment-signs-content-license-agreement-with-youtube-697542.htm).
123. Press Release, YouTube, Universal Music Group and YouTube Forge Strategic
Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/universal-music-group-andyoutube-forge-strategic-partnership-697518.htm).
124. CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic Content and Advertising Partnership, CBS
CORPORATION (Oct. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.cbscorporation.com/newsarticle.php?id=23http://www.thefutoncritic.com/news/2006/10/09/cbs-and-youtube-strike-strategiccontent-and-advertising-partnership-22498/20061009cbs01/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
125. Press Release, YouTube, EMI Music, Google and YouTube Strike Milestone Partnership
(May 31, 2007), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/EMI-Music-Google-and-YouTubeStrike-Milestone-Partnership-737984.htm.
126. Eric Bangeman, YouTube, NBA Sign Content Deal, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/02/8930.ars.
127. Rhys Blakely, Chelsea Signs YouTube Deal, TIMES ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2007),
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/ article1396564.ece.
128. Greg Sandoval, YouTube Signs Sony, Preps Site for Studio Content, CNET NEWS (Apr. 16,
2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10221459-93.html.
129. Miguel Helft, Google Courts Small YouTube Deals, and Very Soon, a Larger One, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/02/technology/02google.html?_r=1.
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In addition, under this agreement, UMG broadly embraces the power
and creativity of user-generated content, allowing users to incorporate
music from UMG’s recorded music catalog into the videos they create
and upload onto YouTube. UMG and its artists will be compensated
not just for UMG produced videos but also for the unique, user created
content that incorporates UMG music.130

The licensing agreement with Sony BMG deviated slightly from the
depicted course, and did not explicitly include UGC as part of the deal.
Instead the parties agreed to “work together to develop new and exciting
opportunities which allow users to include certain SONY BMG sound
recordings in their own uploads, adding to the Internet’s most vibrant
video entertainment destination.”131 Derivatively, it was also stated that
Sony BMG will “work with YouTube to expeditiously remove certain
copyrighted materials which are not available for exhibition on the
site.”132
The following partnership with EMI also underlined the use of
copyrighted materials in UGC, tagging the pact as “a landmark
agreement which will give YouTube users unprecedented access to
authorized videos and recordings from EMI Music artists, including
those featured in user generated content”.133 However, a new, more
standardized method for Second Level Agreements emerged as the press
release specifically referred to “YouTube’s industry-leading content
management tools, which feature a content identification and reporting
system that will help EMI track and monetize its content and
compensate its artists.”134 Similar to the arrangement in the YouTubeSony partnership, and most likely pursuant to the new content
identification technology, EMI would be able to “request the removal of
EMI’s copyrighted content from YouTube.”135
In 2007, YouTube also launched AudioSwap, a feature that allows
users to easily replace audio in a clip with musical tracks from a library
being built with help from artists with whom YouTube has content
distribution deals.136 The most notable deal in this context was
YouTube’s partnership with the sonic branding and music-licensing
130. Press Release, supra note 124 (emphasis added).
131. Press Release, supra note 123.
132. Id.
133. Press Release, supra note 126 (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. YouTube AudioSwap, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/audioswap_main. See Pete
Cashmore, YouTube Launches AudioSwap—Keeping the RIAA Happy?, MASHABLE-THE SOCIAL
MEDIA GUIDE (Feb. 23, 2007), http://mashable.com/2007/02/23/youtube-audioswap/.
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agency Rumblefish.137 The AudioSwap option, however, is limited to
adding the audio track as is to the video, with no option of editing the
video (e.g., slowing the music at some points, cutting irrelevant
segments, etc.).138 In this sense, the AudioSwap agreements heralded a
drift towards standardizing Second Level Agreements.
Another expression of the said standardization tendency is the
development of content identification technology—usually referred to as
“Content ID.”
While it appears that YouTube still negotiates
individually with major content owners, the Content ID system makes
the licensing process shorter, clearer, and more efficient. To enjoy the
system’s advantages, rights holders must deliver YouTube reference
files (audio-only or video) of their content, metadata describing that
content, and policies on what they want YouTube to do in case of a
match.139 The system then compares videos uploaded to YouTube
against those reference files, automatically identifies the copyrighted
content, and applies the preferred policy: monetizing through ad
revenue share, track, or block. The move into a standard process
through YouTube’s Content ID has panned out to be a successful
business model, with every major U.S. network broadcaster, movie
studio, and record label using it.140 Over 1,000 content owners have
uploaded to the system more than 1 million reference files (more than
100,000 hours of material).141 The vast majority of copyright holders
elect not to remove infringing content, but to monetize it by linking to
official content or overlaying it with ads.142
Common UGC, however, has turned out to be a poor source for
advertisement revenue. While people are prepared to view commercials
and ads when watching professional content, they are for the most part
137. YouTube Taps Rumblefish for Music Catalog Access, RUMMBLEBLOG (Mar. 12, 2008),
http://rumblefish.com/blog/2008/12/03/youtube-taps-rumblefish-for-music-catalogaccess/http://pressrelease.omani.ac/submit/youtube_taps_rumblefish_for_music_catalog_access.
138. See Music tracks in my video, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Apr. 18, 2010),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13d5fbc81b1ec530&hl=en&search_im
pression_id=39ffb07e000b57f1%3A1283ae2f862&search_source=related_question (“Fair enough
there is a feature called AudioSwap—which enables you to choose from a fair selection of music
and overwrite your audio track with whatever track you pick from their AudioSwap library. But
how are you supposed to edit your video clips, especially where I want the clips to change in time to
the music?”).
139. Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
140. Kyle Harrison, Over 1,000 content owners now using Content ID, YOUTUBE BIZ BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2009), http://ytbizblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/over-1000-content-owners-now-using.html.
141. Id.
142. Liz Gannes, From Monitor to Monetize: The Evolution of YouTube Content ID, NEW TEE
VEE (Sept. 28, 2009), http://newteevee.com/2009/09/28/from-monitor-to-monetize-the-evolutionof-youtube-content-id/.
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unwilling to do so when it comes to UGC.143 Furthermore, advertisers
have found that user-created videos of pet pratfalls and oddball skits are
largely incompatible with commercials for cars and other products.144
With the costs of bandwidth and storage to stream more than 5 billion
clips a month far exceeding YouTube’s revenue from advertising,
YouTube has been striving to attract more professionally produced
videos to lure higher-priced advertisements.145
The imperative of making YouTube profitable brought about a shift
from centering on authorized UGC to offering a vast library of
professionally-produced videos. YouTube entered deals to provide ondemand premium short clips, e.g., the partnerships with BBC,146
Channel 4,147 Disney,148 and Time Warner.149 YouTube has also signed
pacts to broadcast full episodes of popular TV shows and even full
length films,150 to stream live events (e.g., major sporting events,151
143. Yonatan Sela, Should a Video Website Include UGC?, TVINCI BLOG (July 1, 2009),
http://www.tvinci.com/blog/?p=10.
144. Brad Stone, Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?_r=1.
145. Brian Stelter & Miguel Helft, Deal Brings TV Shows and Movies to YouTube, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/business/media/17youtube.html [hereinafter
Stelter & Helft].
146. Press Release, BBC, BBC and YouTube Partner to Bring Short-Form BBC Content to
Online
audiences
(Mar.
2,
2007),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/03_march/02/you_tube.shtml).
147. See YouTube-Channel 4 Partnership, supra note 101.
148. Press Release, Disney, DISNEY/ABC Television Group and ESPN Reach Landmark
Agreement
(Mar.
30,
2009),
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2009/2009_0331_you_tube.html.
149. Time Warner Newsroom, Time Warner and YouTube Reach Agreement to Post Huge
Array of Short-Form Clips From Movies, Television Shows and News Reports, TIME WARNER
(Aug.
19,
2009),
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,1917436,00.htmlhttp://www.timewarner.co
m/newsroom/pressreleases/2009/08/Time_Warner_YouTube_Reach_Agreement_to_Post_Huge_Array_08-192009.php.
150. YouTube reached an agreement with HBO to stream full length episodes of HBO’s
original series, “In Treatment” on HBO YouTube Channel. See Press Release, YouTube, It’s Not
TV; It’s HBO . . . On YouTube; HBO Launches Official YouTube Channel (Feb. 25, 2008),
http://www.fiercewireless.com/press-releases/its-not-tv-its-hbo-youtube-hbo-launches-officialyoutube-channel. YouTube also announced an agreement to show some full-length television
shows and films from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios (MGM). See Press Release, YouTube, MGM
Partners with YouTube to Launch Several New Channels Featuring Fan-Favorite Clips, Full-Length
Clips, Full-Length TV Shows and Films (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.pressreleasepoint.com/mgmpartners-youtube-launch-several-new-channels-featuring-fanfavorite-clips-fulllength-tv-shows-and.
151. In January 2009, YouTube announced its first worldwide sports deal to stream Indian
Premier League (IPL) cricket matches live online. The agreement enabled YouTube to have the
rights to broadcast the cricket matches all over the world, not just in markets where the IPL has not
sold TV rights. See Mark Sweney, YouTube Confirms Worldwide Deal for Live Indian Premier
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concerts,152 etc.), and to offer video rentals.153 All these agreements are
not Second Level Agreements for they target the passive end-users
rather than the users-providers addressed by Second Level Agreements.
The YouTube case has demonstrated the progression of the Second
Level Agreements practice through two, somewhat conflicting, market
developments. On the one hand, the gradual shift towards an efficient
standard licensing process (enabled by identification and filtering
technology and the AudioSwap library) has curtailed transaction costs
and consequently encouraged the growth of the Second Level
Agreements practice. On the other hand, the inadequacy of UGC to
provide an appropriate advertising medium has incentivized platforms to
seek alternative revenue generators, thus moving down the place of
UGC in the platform’s licensing priority.154
While YouTube is a befitting representation of the depicted
movements, one could also find them in other UGC platforms. Social
networking website, MySpace, has employed content identification
technologies to enable copyright owners to monetize their content.155 At
the same time, MySpace recognized that although UGC accounts for a
majority of videos consumed in the United States, the bulk of revenues
comes from premium content. MySpace’s video vice president stated
“we have seen big increases in premium intent viewing over UGC.

League
Cricket,
GUARDIAN
UK
(Jan.
20,
2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jan/20/youtube-live-indian-premier-league. The deal turned
out to be a major success for YouTube as YouTube’s IPL Cricket has currently over 49.5 million
views. See Jason Kincaid, YouTube’s IPL Cricket Streams Near 50 Million Views, Blow Away
Internal Expectations, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/23/youtubesipl-cricket-streams-near-50-million-views-blow-away-internal-expectations/.
152. See Jarrett Martineau, YouTube to Stream Live Concert Event, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.nowpublic.com/tech-biz/youtube-stream-live-concert-event [YouTube Live Channel
Account Closed].
153. Rosemary Black, YouTube’s Video Rental Service Debuts Tomorrow with Five Indie
Films, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2010/01/21/2010-0121_youtubes_video_rental_service_debuts_tomorrow.html.
See also YouTube Store,
YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/store (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
154. Some are expecting this tendency to increase in the future: “By 2011, ad-funded free to
view TV shows will account for 10 times more consumption than paid. By 2012, premium TV
programming will have 10% more consumers than user-generated.” Matt O’Hern, User Generated
Content is Dead, MARKETING SHIFT—ONLINE MARKETING BLOG (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.marketingshift.com/2008/12/user-generated-content-is-dead.cfm.
155. Jason Kincaid, MySpace, Auditude, and MTV Have just Figured out how to Monetize
Online Video, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/11/02/myspace-auditudeand-mtv-have-just-figured-out-how-to-monetize-online-video/.
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Premium content views probably close to doubled in the last year.”156
The leading European UGC platform, Dailymotion, also went through
the same process, as it employs identification technologies and has
entered several content partnerships with copyright owners to broadcast
various kinds of content to their users.157 Another example is the social
networking site imeem, which announced in March 2007 a partnership
with SNOCAP, a music technology company. The parties agreed to
launch a content identification registry system to enable artists to
monetize their works when shared on imeem.158 From its early days,
imeem permitted users to interact with each other by streaming,
uploading, and sharing music and music videos. However, in June 2009,
imeem announced they were “simplifying” their website and deleting all
user-generated photos and videos, because of costs and concerns over
their return on investment.159 With virtually no return of imeem’s
investment, as advertisers aren’t interested in seeing their content next to
amateur videos, there wasn’t any reason left for hosting UGC.160
C.

The Sphere of Second Level Agreements

Although Second Level Agreements have turned out to be a
common practice within the operation of UGC platforms, a clear
distinction must be made between different types of platforms. While
audio and video UGC are widely governed by Second Level
Agreements, image-sharing, blogs, and fan fiction websites are not.
Even though complaints about mass infringement on photo-sharing
websites are widespread, there have been no reported content
partnerships involving photo-sharing hosts.161 The same applies to

156. Erick Schonfeld, Visible Measures Now Tracking Videos at MySpace, TECH CRUNCH
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/04/14/visible-measures-now-tracking-videos-atmyspace/.
157. Jondet, supra note 110.
158. Press Release, supra note 109.
159. Frederic Lardinois, imeem Wants to Simplify Its Service - Deletes All User-Generated
Photos
and
Videos,
READ
WRITE
WEB
(June
26,
2009),
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/imeem_wants_to_simplify_its_service_deletes_all_photos_
videos.php.
160. Id.
161. E.g., Mary Tafoya, Shame on Picasa, MARY TAFOYA BLOG (May 15, 2008),
http://seriousbeader.blogspot.com/2008/05/shame-on-picasa.html (describing the case of a Picasa
user who uploaded 53 public albums, all of which are full of scans of copyrighted books); Ian L.
Sitren, Flickr Member Copyright Infringement (theft), SPORTS SHOOTER MEMBER MESSAGE BOARD
(Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.sportsshooter.com/message_display.html?tid=27195 (complaining
about a Flickr member who posted on his account 193 of Ian’s photos).
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blogs, where copyright infringements occur all the time.162 Fan fiction
websites, by their nature, invite extensive copyright infringements.163
Still, no agreements have been reported between fan fiction platforms
and copyright owners.164
Not only have Second Level Agreements been employed
exclusively by certain types of platforms, these agreements have also
covered only certain types of content. This is why copyright
infringement in photographs is omnipresent on websites like YouTube
and MySpace, regardless of their engagement in many content
partnerships.165 Images are currently not included in any Second Level
Agreement for several reasons. First, it is possible that Second Level
Agreements do not offer identification of images within a video because,
while contemporary technologies can enable right owners to identify and
locate images used on the Internet,166 images currently cannot be

162. In October 2006, Paparazzi photo agency, X17, sued celebrity gossip blogger Mario
Lavandeira (aka Perez Hilton) for allegedly posting its photographic images without permission. In
January 2008, the parties reached a settlement and on April 21, 2008, the court dismissed the case
without prejudice. For a full description of the case, see X17 Inc. v. Lavandeira, CITIZEN MEDIA
LAW
PROJECT
(Sept.
10,
2007),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/x17-inc-vlavandeira#description (case discussed on the website is: X17 Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d
1102 (C.D. Cal., 2007)).
163. While many scholars advocate recognizing fan fiction as fair use, fan fiction is generally
considered copyright infringement. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction,
and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 654 (1997) (calling to recognize certain types
of fan fiction as fair use); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A
Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597, 598-601 (2007);
Rachel L. Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 191 (2010).
164. While some authors invite and encourage fan fiction (e.g., Star Trek creator Gene
Roddenberry and Paramount Pictures, who publicly approved noncommercial Star Trek fan fiction),
some authors (such as Anne Rice) have publicly asked fans to refrain from writing fan fiction. See
Lee, supra note 6, at 1532-33.
165. For example, Richter Scales, a San Francisco-based choral group made a video named
“Here Comes another Bubble,” where the group mixed original imagery with photos found online,
and set satirical lyrics about the Silicon Valley lifestyle to Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire.”
The video quickly became a hit on YouTube, generating over one million views. However,
photographer Lane Hartwell, whose photograph appeared in the video, got the video removed from
YouTube based on a claim of copyright infringement. See Lewis Wallace, Why Lane Hartwell
Popped
the
‘Bubble’
Video,
WIRED
(Dec.
14,
2007),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/theweb/news/2007/12/photographers. Following Hartwell’s
complaint, the offending image was removed and the video is now back on YouTube. See Here
Comes Another Bubble v.1.1—The Richter Scales, YOUTUBE (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6IQ_FOCE6I.
166. E.g., PICSCOUT—EVERY IMAGE GETS ITS CREDIT, http://www.picscout.com/ (PicScout is
an information company that maintains a large index of fingerprinted and owner identified images,
and enables its clients to protect and promote image usage across digital platforms and devices by
using the company’s image recognition fingerprinting technology.).
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detected under existing video identification technologies. Second,
supposedly following the lack of relevant identification technologies, a
relatively small amount of infringement is being reported. With rather
few cases of detected copyright infringement in images, there is virtually
no incentive for platforms to engage in Second Level Agreements with
copyright holders. In addition, when compared to music and motion
pictures, images were never too expansive due to their limited
popularity. With the web offering a vast amount of free images, the
average unit cost per image has decreased even more, making it a less
desirable product for platforms’ users.167
The absence of Second Level Agreements for image use has mainly
two consequences. First, Second Level Agreements have shifted the
burden of paying for the identification technology and monitoring UGC
from the copyright owner to the platform’s operator. For example,
music labels have employed identification technologies long before
Second Level Agreements became a ubiquitous practice. Between 200204, Universal Music Group168 and EMI169 signed agreements with
Audible Magic, a provider of content management and anti-piracy
services, to provide audio fingerprinting services to identify copyrighted
music on the Internet. Notwithstanding these pacts, when the labels
formed Second Level Agreements with platforms owners, the burden to
initiate and maintain identification and filtering systems was imposed on
the latter. Because operators of photo-sharing platforms never entered
any Second Level Agreement, no similar shift of burden occurred, thus
right holders in images still bear the costs of tracking their content over
the Web. Second, image right holders often choose the course of either
Creative Commons licensing170 or tolerated use. Many of them post
their photographs on photo-sharing platforms with full awareness of the
likely possibility that others will use these photos.
The centralization of the Second Level Agreements practice in
video and audio content can be grounded in two additional explanations.

167. OECD, PARTICIPATIVE WEB AND USER CREATED CONTENT—WEB 2.0, WIKIS AND
SOCIAL NETWORKING 61 (2007).
168. Press Releases, Audible, Magic Forms Agreement with Universal Music Group to
Support
its
RepliCheck
Anti-Piracy
System
(Aug.
12,
2003),
http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-releases/pr-2003-08-12.asp.
169. Evan Hansen, EMI, Audible Magic ink anti-piracy deal, CNET (Apr. 21, 2001),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-963756.html.
170. For example, in March 2010, the estimated number of Creative Commons licensed images
on Flickr was 135 million. For detailed statistics, see Mike Linksvayer, Creative Commons licenses
on Flickr: many more images, slightly more freedom, CREATIVE COMMONS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/20870.
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The first is the linking and embedding options, offered by many content
websites, and the second is the nature of non-audio and video UGC
platforms and copyright owners. Linking and embedding are common
in certain social networks sites (like Facebook), where the use of
copyrighted materials is omnipresent. Many bloggers also usually
embed photos and videos to illustrate their posting. The code that
embeds an element is merely a text guiding the computer’s Internet
browser to the location of the specified file.171 Recently the embedding
function has been enhanced, as some major blogging platforms have
come to facilitate the reproduction of content from other websites by
offering a “reblog” feature.172 “Reblogging” is much the same as
embedding; it enables the blogger to compose a new post housed on the
blog suffixed with the headline, description, thumbnail, and link to the
source material.173
Major video streaming sites, including YouTube, allow most of
their files to be embedded in other websites.174 Some photo-sharing
websites also offer embedding features, although only the account
holder, usually the person who uploaded the photographs, is authorized
for such use.175 Twitter,176 a social networking and micro blogging

171. Jason J. Lunardi, Guerrilla Video: Potential Copyright Liability for Websites that Index
Links to Unauthorized Streaming Content, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1077,
1081 (2009).
172. TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/ (pioneered the reblog concept, enabling its users to
repost content from another blog). WordPress, the top host of blogs, added a “reblog” feature in
June 2010. We All Like to Reblog, WORDPRESS, http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/we-alllike-to-reblog/. The makers of Movable Type offer a reblog feature. reBlog, MOVEABLE TYPE,
http://plugins.movabletype.org/reblog/. Google Blogger provides a BlogThis extension, which can
be added to the browser’s toolbar, to create a mini-interface to Blogger, presented with a link to the
web
page
the
blogger
is
visiting.
What
is
BlogThis?!,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/support/blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=41469.
173. Mark Milian, Reblog this at your own legal risk, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2010),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/06/reblog-copyright.html.
174. YouTube, however, also allows its users to disable the embedding feature on videos they
post, at their discretion. See Can I enable or disable the option to embed my videos?, GOOGLE,
http:// www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=74648. This is also true as
to YouTube’s content partners. EMI decided to block embedding functions on YouTube because
the embedded videos could not be monetized. See Liz Ohanesian, Why EMI’s YouTube Policy Is
Short-Sighted,
LA
WEEKLY
BLOGS
(Jan.
20,
2010),
http://blogs.laweekly.com/westcoastsound/synthful/emi-youtube-ok-go/.
175. Flickr, for example, allows users to upload photos to their account and then embed them
either as individual images or as a slideshow. See Brian Herzog, Embedding Content in Websites,
SWISS
ARMY
LIBRARIAN
(June
17,
2008),
http://www.swissarmylibrarian.net/2008/06/17/embedding-content-in-websites.
176. TWITTER, http://twitter.com.
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platform, also put into practice a “retweet” (“RT”) feature, which allows
its users to instantly repost messages with credit to the originator.177
The legal status of linking, embedding, reblogging, and retweeting
is unclear. While uploading copyrighted content to a video hosting site
by unauthorized users may strike one as an obvious copyright
infringement, it does not seem as obvious if a site merely links to content
that is already available on the Internet elsewhere.178 While the legality
of embedding content exceeds the boundaries of this discussion, it is safe
to argue that in cases of linking to infringing content without
authorization, and absent a fair use defense, the secondary liability
potential is fairly high.179 Yet, probably due to the practice of tolerated
use as well as current Second Level Agreements covering some of the
embedded content, embedded content is boundless over the Internet.
With the ability to embed, which rarely encounters any demand of
removal by the copyright owner, blog operators have little incentive to
engage in Second Level Agreements.
The practice of Second Level Agreements has also not extended to
photo-sharing, blogs and fan fiction websites due to the nonconcentrated nature of the potential parties. Photographers, fan fiction
writers, and other authors, though they may be joined under some
organization,180 often distribute their works as individuals or through
small companies. When a platform wishes to license the use made by its
users, it is easier and cheaper to do so with one representative of several
177. What
Is
Retweet?
(RT),
TWITTER
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://help.twitter.com/forums/10711/entries/77606-what-is-retweet-rt.
178. Bloggers started debating the legality of embedding back in 2007. The Blog Herald
suggested that bloggers could be held liable for embedding and infringing video on their sites.
Jonathan Bailey, Copyright Risks in Embedding YouTube Clips, THE BLOG HERALD (July 9, 2007),
http://www.blogherald.com/2007/07/09/the-copyright-risk-of-embedding-youtube-clips/. Fred von
Lohmann argued that an embedded YouTube video is just a link so “there is no reason to be
concerned about potential liability.” Fred von Lohmann, YouTube Embedding and Copyright,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
DEEPLINKS
BLOG
(July
9,
2007),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/07/youtube-embedding-and-copyright. Another post on Techdirt
made a similar observation, stating that “[a]ll you’ve done is put a single line of HTML on your
page.” Mike Masnick, Is it Copyright Infringement to Embed an Infringing YouTube Video on Your
Blog?, TECHDIRT (July 3, 2007), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070703/144358.shtml.
Nonetheless, academic study of this issue is sparse, as only two law review articles discussing the
question could be found: Seth A. Metsch, Embedded Media: Apps, Widgets, RSS and Embedded
Content, 978 PLI/PAT 235 (2009), and Lunardi, supra note 172. While Lunardi focuses on websites
with embedded copyrighted video through in-line links, what he refers to as “indexing websites,” he
does not analyze users embedded. His review is helpful in the latter embedding context too.
179. See Metsch, supra note 179, at 245-47, and Lunardi, supra note 172, at 1116-25.
180. E.g., PPA—PROFESSIONAL PHOTOGRAPHERS OF AMERICA, http://www.ppa.com/; APA—
ADVERTISING PHOTOGRAPHERS OF AMERICA, http://www.apanational.com/; NATIONAL PRESS
PHOTOGRAPHERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nppa.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
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copyright owners, rather than to negotiate each license separately. In
this sense, the fact that many of the copyrights in music and motion
pictures belong to a small number of companies enabled the practice of
Second Level Agreements to flourish. The same applies to the
platforms; while it seems that blogs, fan-fiction, and photo-sharing
websites adhere to a model of many small-scale websites,181 video and
audio platforms operate within a much larger scale.182 The practical
outcome of this observation is that video and audio platforms can offer
exposure to a larger audience composed of both users-consumers and
users-providers, which makes them more attractive partners for Second
Level Agreements.
In the following sections, I attempt to analyze the positive and
negative aspects of the Second Level Agreements practice, offer some
suggestions to ameliorate the practice to enhance certainty and
transparency, and provide a prediction as to the agreements’ future.
D.

Second Level Agreements—Virtues and Vices

Second Level Agreements are new creatures in copyright practice.
They clearly indicate that cyberspace is moving toward a model of
consensual self-governance against a backdrop of enforceable legal
framework. While these agreements represent many opportunities for
copyright holders, users-consumers, and users-providers, they also
involve some disadvantages that have to be considered. It seems that in
their never-ending relationship with technology, copyright owners have
learned some lessons from the past, and rather than fighting the advent
of UGC platforms as a distribution method, they have chosen to join
forces with these platforms. The Second Level Agreements practice
evidences a preference of an agreement model over a culture of litigation
and copyright infringements.
Although Second Level Agreements cannot offer compensation
similar to that provided by traditional distribution models, they benefit
copyright owners in several ways. First, copyright holders have a clear
financial incentive to enter these agreements. Even though the precise
monetary terms of current Second Level Agreements are not disclosed, it
was made public that copyright owners receive consideration in the form
181. Of course, there are big and popular websites such as Flickr and Picasa, and Google itself
offers a Blogging platform. Still, the popularity and success of these websites are far from
YouTube or MySpace’s magnitude.
182. This can be explained by the relatively expensive cost of storing videos and audio,
compared to texts (blogs and fan-fiction) and images (blogs, fan-fiction, and photo-sharing
platforms).
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of company stakes, ad revenue share, or royalties.183 Second, the
practice of Second Level Agreements lowers monitoring costs for
copyright owners with respect to content on UGC platforms, thereby
enabling them to economize on enforcement costs (e.g., sending DMCA
notices, litigation costs, etc.).184 Because near-perfect enforcement of
the widespread copyright infringement over the Internet is virtually
impossible, Second Level Agreements not only reduce enforcement
costs, but also monetize uses that otherwise would not be generating
revenues.185 The practice also lessens transaction costs, as copyright
holders do not need to negotiate and execute individual licenses for a
great number of users. Third, on top of their role as content distributors,
UGC platforms are an excellent promotion means. Thanks to UGC
platforms, copyright owners enjoy vast exposure and easy access to the
copyrighted works of consumers and fans. Studies show that currently
content owners are badly deficient in media progression, and that UGC
platforms provide an excellent way for them to distribute their content
extensively to old and new viewers.186 Therefore, Second Level
Agreements bestow upon copyright holders a form of “benefit basket”—
an opportunity to save previously spent costs, and to gain further
compensation for uses of their works.
Second Level Agreements are also advantageous to users. From a
user-consumer perspective, the total of available works to consume
accelerated dramatically with the rise of UGC platforms. Second Level
Agreements boosted the said expansion, offering additional free content
in better quality. The variety of works has broadened too, as Second
Level Agreements involve not only professionally produced content, but
also amateur works and derivative adaptations. Creative users enjoy the
183. For example, YouTube-WMG press release, states that: “YouTube and WMG will share
revenue from advertising on both WMG music videos and user uploaded videos that incorporate
audio and audiovisual works from WMG’s catalog.” Supra note 7.
184. For example, NBC Universal used to employ a staff of three to police the copyright
violations made possible by YouTube and to send over one thousand notice and takedown requests.
See Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235,
238-39 (2008).
185. Before Second Level Agreements were in play, many unauthorized uses were not even
discovered by the copyright owner. Even when a copyright owner found her work being used in a
user-created work, she could either ask for the removal of the content through a notice and
takedown procedure, or tolerate the use. In neither of these choices could the copyright owner
financially benefit from the use. Second Level Agreements added another choice by allowing right
holders to monetize such uses.
186. See Steve Ragan, YouTube Making Waves with Content Protection Offers, MONSTERS
AND
CRITICS
(Feb.
26,
2007),
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/tech/news/article_1269205.php/YouTube_making_waves_with
_content_protection_offers.
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new practice as well because they may draw inspiration from a greater
array of works, as more content is free and legally accessible. Their
opportunities for creation also grew considerably in view of the fact that
users can now borrow protected elements of previously existing works,
and employ them in new works without the burdensome obligation to
negotiate a license or compensate the right holder. Because many UGC
platforms have to remove suspected infringing content pursuant to a
DMCA notice, without Second Level Agreements, creative users had no
creation alternatives and a great amount of speech would have been
concealed. Second Level Agreements made a long progress towards
alleviating this problem, as much of the derivative UGC currently
remains online. Furthermore, Second Level Agreements have provided
a unique opportunity for some creative users to disseminate their works
on a larger scale, and even become professional providers of content.187
Second Level Agreements, however, are not a panacea for all
copyright dilemmas in the age of UGC. They involve some difficulties
that must be seriously considered. First, Second Level Agreements have
a significant effect on the legal state of users-providers, as they operate
under a license to which they were not a party, and of whose terms they
are not fully aware. Although users may learn some details as to the
terms of the agreements through the media, users cannot get full
disclosure of what they are allowed to do pursuant to a Second Level
Agreement. Moreover, even though in practice UGC employing
copyrighted content in accordance with an agreement will remain online,
Second Level Agreements supposedly involve no legal consequences for
users. Users are legally bound only by the platform’s terms of service,
which have not changed in accordance with the agreements. For
example, even YouTube, the most common signatory of Second Level
Agreements, states in its terms of service: “In connection with User
Submissions, you further agree that you will not submit material that is
copyrighted . . . unless you are the owner of such rights or have
permission from their rightful owner to post the material and to grant
YouTube all of the license rights granted herein.”188 Under these terms
of service, Second Level Agreements purportedly have no legal
187. Cory Williams made his break in 2007 when he uploaded a music video parody, which
has been viewed more than 15 million times. With more than 80,000 subscribers to his videos,
Williams earns $17,000 to $20,000 a month via YouTube. See Brian Stelter, YouTube Videos Pull
In
Real
Money,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/business/media/11youtube.html?_r=2 (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
188. YouTube Terms of Service 6(D), YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011).
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influence over users, as the latter are still required not to submit
copyrighted materials, regardless of the fact that such content may be
permitted under an existing pact.189
The depicted state sends a mystifying message to UGC platforms’
users. Active UGC website participants are usually well informed and
generally familiar with the existence of Second Level Agreements. Such
users normally understand that their infringing materials have not been
removed pursuant to some copyright license acquired by the platform.
Common unaware users, however, in a better scenario employ
copyrighted materials believing that their infringement is not being
detected or enforced, and in a worse scenario do not even realize that
their actions may constitute copyright infringement.190
In addition to the detrimental educational effect, the agreements’
opacity has further consequence. Because Second Level Agreements do
not involve users at any stage of the legal relationship, these pacts—
formally speaking—only protect the platform. It is not clear, thus, what
is the legal status of platforms’ users under these agreements. Because a

189. MySpace Terms of Use Agreement follow the same path, in spite of their content deal
with MTV: “MySpace respects the intellectual property of others, and requires that our users do the
same. You may not upload, embed, post, email, transmit or otherwise make available any material
that infringes any copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other proprietary rights of any person
or
entity.”
Terms
of
Use
Agreement,
MYSPACE,
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
190. E.g., a question posted on YouTube’s Help Forum by a user named amydiane197831 on
September 2009: “I tried to upload a video w/ Bette Midler’s song Wind Beneath My Wings and
YouTube came back saying that I violated a copyright law with the song. I can’t have a song on
here by a famous artist that has a copyright. BUT i see SEVERAL YOUTUBE USERS WITH
VIDEOS WITH SONGS THAT HAVE COPYRIGHTS! Some of them might’ve gotten permission
by the record label, but not all of them had to. I see that they give credit on their video to the artist.
I could do that, but how do I do that??” Help forum, YOUTUBE (Sept. 15, 2009),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=6d94739c48265476&hl=en. See also
a post on the same forum by missk on October 2009: “I don’t understand why it is okay for some
users to post material from other sources (i.e. TV shows, films, etc.) and not others. I will admit, I
posted a show from another source [MTV-Viacom]. After a few days, my videos were taken down
for copyright infringement, but there are other users with the same exact videos up and theirs are
still there and have been for weeks. If it is copyright infringement for me, should it not be for them?
I seriously doubt any of them got permission from Viacom to post that material.” Help forum,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
30,
2009),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13ecbd1b27983fc0&hl=en. See also
post on YouTube Help forum by the user “djmambito”: “My video blocked . . . same video not
blocked 1000 others (Shakira—Waka Waka).” Help forum, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2010),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=737e8ba495e8d80d&hl=en. Last, see
a user complaint about YouTube’s allegedly “discriminating” removal policy, posted by the user
missk: “Why is YouTube so inconsistent with their ‘so-called’ copyright infringement rules?” Help
forum,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
30,
2009),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=13ecbd1b27983fc0&hl=en.
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claim of secondary liability cannot be established without direct
infringement, the facilitator of the alleged infringing activity is immune
from liability when the original user acts lawfully (e.g., pursuant to a
license, in compliance with the fair use defense, etc.). Second Level
Agreements, however, involve a license granted to the facilitator of the
infringing activity, which is not formally conveyed to direct users
through the platform-users agreement. Besides users’ inability to know
the authorized boundaries of their actions, copyright owners could
theoretically demand to retain the right to sue individuals for direct
infringements. In such case, it is unclear whether an exemption for a
secondary infringer necessarily entails an exemption for the direct
infringer. Although platforms’ users would probably have a valid
defense in cases of individual lawsuits,191 the absence of any formal
indication of Second Level Agreements in the platforms’ terms of use
leaves users in a legal status akin to the one they have under tolerated
use—unknown, unstable, and uncertain.
Second Level Agreements can also be criticized for hindering any
potential illumination of current uncertainty surrounding a fair use
analysis for uploaded UGC. When applying fair use standards to UGC,
as well as to any other use, the outcome may vary greatly due to the
context-dependent character of this defense.192 As a result, it is
complicated for legal counsels, and for unprofessional users all the more
so, to determine whether a certain uploaded content amounts to fair use.
The obscurity is greater in the UGC context as currently there is no case
law analyzing fair use for cases of uploaded UGC.193 The field’s relative

191. See infra Section VIII.i and accompanying text.
192. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 377.
193. This refers to February 2011. Most of the cases that scrutinized UGC uploads within the
copyright sphere did so in the context of secondary liability. In December 2009, EMI Music
imprints Capitol, Caroline, Virgin, and EMI Music Publishing filed a suit against Vimeo.com,
alleging that the site infringes the plaintiff’s copyrights by encouraging its users to post videos
employing copyrighted music. This suit also centers on “lip dubs,” homemade videos of fans lipsynching various songs. While the lawsuit is expected to revolve around secondary liability issues
and DMCA safe harbors, it will also have to involve a decision as to whether “lip dubs” and similar
mash-ups of amateur and professional content are infringing. The case is still in a very initial stage.
Complaint for Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, Inducement to Infringe
Copyright, Misappropriation, and Unfair Competition, Capitol Records, LLC., v. Vimeo LLC.,
2009 WL 4918771 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09 CV 10101). In Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), Stephanie Lenz was sent a takedown notice for
posting a home video of her toddler stumbling through her kitchen, then hearing and bobbing to
Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy on YouTube. Lenz then sent YouTube a DMCA counter-notification
demanding that the video be re-posted because she claimed that the video constituted fair use of the
song and, thus, did not infringe Universal’s copyright. Lenz also brought suit against Universal,
asking for a declaratory judgment that Lenz’s home constitutes fair use, as well as damages, and
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immaturity is not the only explanation for this scarcity. The liability
discussion shifts to the platform’s liability rather than to individual
liability also because copyright owners target the facilitators of the
violations. The basis for such lawsuits would usually be secondary
liability, while fair use defense is attributed to a direct infringer. This
course prevents cases of uploaded UGC from being litigated, and does
not allow any judicial guidelines as to the application of the fair use
defense to be developed.
Still, one could argue that Second Level Agreements enable users
to avoid burdensome dilemmas as to the fairness of their use and save an
unpleasant (and very costly) confrontation with powerful copyright
holders. This argument, however, disregards two attributes of Second
Level Agreements—their non-inclusiveness and their potential
vulnerability. As previously demonstrated, Second Level Agreements
are not inclusive for several reasons.194 When platforms sign Second
Level Agreements, it usually would not include all the works owned by
the contracting copyright owner. The agreement may also refer only to
some of the copyrighted elements of a work.195 Moreover, copyright
owners usually retain the right to demand the removal of content in
specific cases. Consequently, an unknown amount of content is subject
to pre-Second Level Agreements practice, i.e., tolerated use and DMCA
procedure.
The non-inclusiveness issue raises another concern. So far, Second
Level Agreements have involved contracting parties of certain
characteristics only—top UGC platforms, major record labels, dominant
media companies, etc. These characteristics can be encapsulated in three
words—big, popular, and powerful. Aiming at minimizing transaction
costs, economies of scale come once again into play. Platforms’ owners
are basically motivated to contract with big record labels, big media
companies, and big copyright owners of all kinds. In order to employ

injunctive relief restraining Universal from bringing further copyright claims in connection with the
video. However, the court did not analyze Lenz’s use, and thus provided no guiding rules on the
application of this defense to UGC upload.
194. See supra Section V.C.
195. The agreement between Google (YouTube) and Japan Rights Clearance Inc. exemplifies
such a situation. Because this agreement involves only the copyright of lyrics and music, YouTube
users are allowed to post videos of themselves or their friends performing karaoke or doing a cover
of a popular song. They are not permitted, however, to deploy original sound recording or footage
of a musical show on TV, because such acts would violate the copyrights of record companies and
TV networks. See Asahi Shimbun, Google to Pay Royalties to Japanese Firm for YouTube
Uploads,
CHANNEL
NEWS
ASIA
(Mar.
27,
2008),
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/technologynews/view/337593/1/.html.
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reasonable bargaining power to negotiate and execute such agreements
without financially collapsing, the platform must be comparatively
attractive. The platform must be able to offer sufficient benefits (i.e.,
demonstrate high potential revenue) or represent a considerable threat
(i.e., create opportunities for mass infringement), so that conglomerates
would have an incentive to form content partnerships with it. Hence,
small copyright owners and small platforms are unlikely to engage in
Second Level Agreements. Because Second Level Agreements involve
the big players only, the smaller players may justifiably fear that the
practice will be reserved for the elites only, systematically reinforcing
their power in the market. While YouTube includes smaller content
owners in its Partners Program,196 where it pays people with a history of
successfully viewed videos, the difficulty remains, for this program isn’t
tantamount to a Second Level Agreement. YouTube Partners Program
applies mainly to users-providers.197 Because YouTube does not allow
other users to use copyrighted materials belonging to the partner, the
Partner Program resembles an agreement with a premium content owner,
which is aimed at offering content for consumption only.
Apart from their non-inclusiveness, Second Level Agreements also
suffer from a crucial vulnerability pertaining to their duration, as the
YouTube-Warner pact demonstrates. This agreement was about to
expire two years after YouTube obtained the license.198 The parties had
renegotiated for a while, but breakdown in talks led to the removal of the
entire Warner catalog from the website, including many creative usergenerated videos.199 It was only nine months later that the parties
managed to agree and bring Warner’s catalog back onto YouTube.200
Chris Maxcy, Director of YouTube Partner Development, provided
some information about the new deal in a blog post on YouTube Blog:
“Under this new, multi-year global agreement, you will be able to
discover, watch, and share Warner music on the site. The partnership
196. Partners with YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/partners.
197. What
is
the
YouTube
Partner
Program?,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=72851 (last visited on Nov.
18, 2011) (emphasis added) (“Our Partnership Program is a revenue-sharing program that allows
creators and producers of original content to earn money from their popular videos on YouTube”).
198. Peter Kafka, Warner Music Group Disappearing From YouTube: Both Sides Take Credit,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2008), http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20081220/warnermusic-group-disappearing-from-youtube-both-sides-take-credit/.
199. Id. See also Greg Sandoval, YouTube users caught in Warner Music spat, CNET NEWS
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html.
200. Eliot Van Buskirk, Warner’s Music Returns to YouTube Following Nine Month Hiatus,
WIRED (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/09/warner-music-group-signsyoutube-deal/#ixzz0n6jAWEAh.
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covers the full Warner catalog and includes user-generated content
containing WMG acts.”201 Nonetheless, it is not clear whether UGC
incorporating Warner’s content is always allowed on YouTube, or if
Warner retains the right to ask for the removal of videos at its discretion.
Users’ discussions on various forums indicate that, regardless of
YouTube’s license, Warner demands taking off UGC videos from time
to time.202
Second Level Agreements are in force for a specific period, which
is determined by the parties, and not always disclosed. Previous cases
proved that neither renewing negotiations nor continuation of an old
agreement are guaranteed.203 The reasons for not renewing an expired
agreement can vary from lack of profitability or change in popularity, to
a desire to equalize financial terms to those offered to other Second
Level Agreements participants.
Renegotiating Second Level
Agreements can also lead to changing their terms in accordance with
market demands. For example, a platform can choose to forego UGC
and move into a premium content model, or to allow only pure
reproductive UGC while forbidding derivative UGC.
Second Level Agreements can also be criticized for changing the
governing regime of copyright practice without offering users, who are
materially affected by such agreements, or other affected players,204 any
opportunity to debate or participate in this reform. Acting as tools of
self-regulation, contracts are the means by which the parties govern
themselves, in a democratic way.205 Because this “law” binds only its
makers, contractual relationship represents a democratic ideal of

201. Chris Maxcy, Warner Music Comes Back to YouTube, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;) THE
OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2009/09/warnermusic-comes-back-to-youtube.html.
202. For example, a thread on Ukulele Underground forum, Sebi, Posted Ukulele covers on
YouTube being removed by Warner Music Group, UKELELE UNDERGROUND (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://www.ukuleleunderground.com/forum/showthread.php?25142-Ukulele-covers-on-Youtubebeing-removed-by-Warner-Music-Group; Spongeyday, Posted Who is WMG and why are they
claiming certain songs to be “Unauthorized?”, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=33696a3b74bf2bf3&hl=en.
203. For example, 600 videos by the members of the German collecting society (“GEMA”)
were removed from YouTube after contract renewal talks broke down and were never renewed. See
Wolfgang Spahr, GEMA Talks with YouTube Break Down, BILLBOARD.BIZ (May 10, 2010),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3i327b3ab8972bdc8e06c3f112824ccce8.
204. Such as small UGC platforms that may have to enter Second Level Agreements to
conform to industry standards.
205. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 7 (1982) (“[T]he terms of such direct bilateral
exchanges are arrived at voluntarily . . . . Each party to an exchange seeks to maximize his own
economic advantage on terms tolerable to the other party.”).
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government, based on the consent of those governed by it.206 When this
self-governance tool controls someone other than its makers, a troubling
aspect arises. These ‘laws’ are the product of private ordering, as
opposed to a public democratic process.207 The contracting parties are
akin to private legislatures, who impose significant rules without
contemplating the broader public interest that informs democratic rule
making.208 Although Second Level Agreements virtually dominate the
practice of mass production, they do not follow democratic ideals, for
users neither have an option to democratically influence this private law,
nor they are fully aware of its content. Not only does it mean that
affected parties did not assent to existing Second Level Agreements,
rendering them less legitimate, but it also implies that the interests of
these effected parties may not have been considered or protected at all.
As the motivation of UGC platforms has changed from maximizing
users’ traffic to generating a shared revenue source based primarily on
premium content, the economic interests of UGC platforms have moved
closer to those of copyright owners and away from their users’ interests.
Against this backdrop, there is a good reason to believe that while
Second Level Agreements significantly influence many individual users,
none of the parties have been concerned with the interests of these users.
Hence, Second Level Agreements can be argued to inadequately protect
the liberties and interests of other effected players.
Another flow of Second Level Agreements is their reliance on
filtering technology. As previously described, a clear shift towards
standardization of Second Level Agreements has occurred. One
expression of this standardization is the increasing use of content
identification technology by UGC platforms. Filtering technologies,
however, have been widely criticized for being both under-inclusive by

206. Being common and impacting a vast amount of people, this model bears some
resemblance to standard form contracts. Standard forms contracts were often characterized as
private lawmaking—“If by making law we mean imposing officially enforceable duties or creating
or restricting officially enforceable rights, then automobile manufacturers make more warranty law
in a day than most legislatures or courts make in a year.” W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971). See
also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139-42
(2006).
207. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 537 (1971).
208. For a broader discussion of cyberspace self governance, see Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV.
395 (2000) (critiquing claim that a self-governing cyberspace would more fully realize liberal
democratic ideals).
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failing to identify all unlawful content,209 and over-inclusive, by failing
to appropriately accommodate fair use.210 Filtering systems are not
equipped to produce the sort of balancing decisions called for by the fair
use doctrine, as technology cannot apply itself to the qualitative
character of a fair-use analysis, to contemplate external information into
such analysis, or to appropriately handle the separable nature of mixed
media (e.g., original video with copyrighted background music).211 This
state raises several concerns. First, transformative use of copyrighted
content that is a key cultural fount for creative expression is expected to
be impaired. Such an outcome greatly contradicts the constitutional
purpose of copyright law and harms free speech. Second, conditioning
content partnership with the implementation of identification
technologies shifts the monitoring burden to UGC platforms. This,
again, confines the Second Level Agreements practice to major UGC
platforms only, as smaller and less wealthy UGC platforms may not be
able to follow suit due to the high costs associated with the deployment
of a filtering system.212
Content identification systems may also lead to “digital
sharecropping,” in which the copyright owner enjoys licensing revenues
on works that should not warrant it.213 When fair use is identified as
infringement, the copyright owner choosing to monetize the use enjoys
the fruits of the second author’s work, while the latter will be denied
opportunities to obtain any of the revenue generated by her work.
The need to submit copyrighted materials to the UGC platform, in
order to ensure protection by their filtering systems, was also accused of
creating a two-tiered copyright system—right owners that have the
means and the willpower to “register” their works with the platform will
enjoy copyright privileges, whereas those who fail to do so will receive
no protection.214

209. E.g., Liz Gannes, Does Digital Fingerprinting Work?: An Investigative Report,
NEWTEEVEE (June 8, 2007), http://newteevee.com/2007/06/08/does-digital-fingerprinting-work-aninvestigative-report/; Cory Doctorow, Why a Rights Robocop Will Never Work, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/oct/30/copyright.
210. See Sawyer, supra note 19, at 387.
211. Id.
212. For instance, YouTube and Google stated that their Content ID system is the result of
“approximately 50,000 man hours of engineering time and millions of dollars of research and
development costs.” Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
213. See Sawyer, supra note 19, at 386.
214. Tony Bates, The Perils of YouTube Filtering: Part 1, MICHIGAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW BLOG (Dec. 1, 2007), http://blog.mttlr.org/2007/12/perils-ofyoutube-filtering.html#bateslink17.
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Another disruptive consequence of content filtering involves the
increasing proclivity to block automated identified content before it is
publicly available. While this was and still is the stated will of existing
media companies,215 this course eliminates the power of the public to
review the fairness of content removal, and protest when such removal
was unjustified. Previous cases demonstrate clearly that amiss removal
of UGC provokes headlines.216 An example for such public reaction
involves the removal of the “Downfall” parody videos from YouTube.
“Downfall,” a German film portraying Hitler's last days, has been
adopted for YouTube parodies featuring Hitler ranting in German to his
staff, with modern subtitles covering various issues, from the mortgage
meltdown and playing Xbox video games to Kanye West and Apple’s
new iPad.217
In April 2010, these clips, many of which had generated millions of
views, began disappearing from YouTube as Constantin Films, the
company that owns the rights to the “Downfall” film, asked for them to
be removed.218 The removal of the “Downfall” videos engendered wide
public disapproval in professional media, blogs, and users’ posts.219 The
thunderous public attention to the removal immediately occasioned a
response from YouTube, which submitted in a blog post that its Content
ID system was designed to allow copyright owners to account for fair
uses, and that “Rights holders are the only ones in a position to know

215. See Gannes, supra note 210 (“content owners said they wanted all content fingerprinted
before it ever got posted. ‘This was a religious point for some studios,’ said King.”).
216. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 392.
217. E.g., Hitler tries to solve the Gulf Oil Spill Crisis, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dc1623pWjwU; Hitler rants about the Hitler Parodies,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqqxRPZdfvs&feature=related; Hitler is informed
Santa
Claus
doesn’t
exist,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxXpF328r8w&feature=related.
218. Lewis Wallace, Hitler Downfall Videos Being Pulled from YouTube, WIRED (Apr. 20,
2010), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2010/04/hitler-downfall-youtube-purge/.
219. E.g., MG Siegler, Hitler is Very Upset that Constantin Film is Taking Down Hitler
Parodies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/19/hitler-parodytakedown/; Corynne McSherry, Everyone Who’s Made a Hitler Parody Video, Leave the Room,
EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/everyone-who-smade-hitler-parody-leave-room; Jacqui Cheng, Attack on Hitler Parodies Now Newest Front in
Copyright
Wars,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Apr.
2010),
http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/04/attack-on-hitler-parodies-now-newest-front-in-copyright-wars.ars;
Mike
Melanson, YouTube Weighs In on Hitler, Parodies, Mashups & Fair Use, READ WRITE WEB (Apr.
22,
2010),
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/youtube_weighs_in_on_hitler_parodies_mashups_fair.php;
Aaron Barnhart, Why The Take-Down of the 'Hitler' Parodies on YouTube was Illegal, TV WEEK
(Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.tvweek.com/blogs/2010/04/why-the-take-down-of-the-hitler-parodieson-youtube-was-illegal.php.
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what is and is not an authorized use of their content,” and YouTube
“require(s) them to enforce their policies in a manner that complies with
the law.”220 The public discussion also induced some users to challenge
the removal through a DMCA counter notification.221 Had Constantin
Films submitted the content to YouTube’s system earlier, and chose to
block any match, there is a good chance none of these parodies, although
some of them arguably qualify as fair use, would have appeared online.
An additional shortcoming of requiring identification technology as
a prerequisite for Second Level Agreements is that by doing so,
platforms and copyright owners can greatly disrupt the DMCA
takedown and counter-notification balance.222 When the filtering system
automatically blocks matching content, copyright owners are no longer
in need to send takedown notices to ask for the removal of infringing
content. Because a takedown notice was never filed, users cannot send a
counter notification or sue the copyright owner, because they were not
part of the removal process. A suit against the platform can also be
avoided easily through a contractual stipulation in the platform’s terms
of service. Most terms-of-use agreements state that the platform may
remove any content at any time for any reason.223 Because there is no

220. Shenaz Zack, Content ID and Fair Use, BROADCASTING OURSELVES—THE OFFICIAL
YOUTUBE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/04/content-id-and-fairuse.html.
221. E.g., Brad Templeton, Studio Does Content-ID Takedown of my Hitler Video About
Takedowns, BRAD IDEAS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://ideas.4brad.com/studio-does-content-id-takedownmy-hitler-video-about-takedowns (a user whose video has been removed writes in his personal blog
that he filed a dispute over the Content ID takedown).
222. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 385.
223. See YouTube Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (“YouTube
reserves the right to decide whether Content violates these Terms of Service for reasons other than
copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscenity, or excessive length.
YouTube may at any time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, remove such Content
and/or terminate a user’s account for submitting such material in violation of these Terms of
Service.”);
MySpace.com
Terms
of
Use
Agreement,
MYSPACE,
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (“Furthermore, MySpace reserves the
right, in its sole discretion, to reject, refuse to post or remove any posting (including, without
limitation, private messages, emails and instant messages (collectively, ‘messages’)) by you, or to
deny, restrict, suspend, or terminate your access to all or any part of the MySpace Services at any
time, for any or no reason, with or without prior notice or explanation, and without liability.”);
Facebook’s
Statement
of
Rights
and
Responsibilities,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (“We can remove any content or information you post
on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement.”); Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!,
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (which govern also the use of Flickr and
states “You acknowledge that Yahoo! may or may not pre-screen Content, but that Yahoo! and its
designees shall have the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to pre-screen, refuse, or
remove any Content that is available via the Yahoo! Services. Without limiting the foregoing,
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statutory right to upload content, platforms operators and copyright
owners can legally bypass the DMCA takedown procedure, thus leaving
users with no recourse for over-filtering of lawful expression.
Second Level Agreements can also be claimed to represent an
undesired expression of what Professors Patricia Aufderheide and Peter
Jaszi have dubbed the “clearance culture.”224 The clearance culture is
“the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared.”225
In the copyright context, that is to say that users of copyrighted works
often ask copyright owners to license or “clear” these works, even when
the use is lawful. The clearance culture is fostered by the inherent
vagueness in many copyright concepts (chiefly fair use), and the high
costs of litigation. Incentivized by efforts to avoid litigation, many
players in the copyright industries choose to take precessions in the form
of voluntary agreements, which often restrict these players more than is
required under copyright law. Consequently, a conception of the
copyright bundle as all-encompassing emerges, transaction costs are
augmented, and speech is chilled.226
The Veoh cases227 and the Viacom ruling228 indicate that while
Second Level Agreements are legitimate business partnerships, they may
not be required by copyright law. Under the current regime, ISPs are not
obliged to filter uploaded content.229 Google, for example, has always
argued that it not only follows the letter of the law when it comes to its
Safe Harbor obligations, but that it goes “well above and beyond what
the law requires.”230 Yet, even though the law does not require ISPs to
Yahoo! and its designees shall have the right to remove any Content that violates the TOS or is
otherwise objectionable.”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
224. Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Ctr. for Soc. Media, Untold Stories: Creative
Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers 22, ACCIL (2004),
http://www.acsil.org/resources/rights-clearances-1/nps240.tmp.pdf.
225. Id. at 22.
226. Id.
227. IO Grp. Inc. v. Veoh Networks. Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
228. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
229. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
230. Eric Bangeman, Google Cites Safe Harbor, Fair Use in Viacom v. YouTube Defense, ARS
TECHNICA (May 1, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/05/google-cites-safeharbor-fair-use-in-viacom-v-youtube-defense.ars; Greg Sandoval, Veoh Wins Copyright Case;
YouTube Wins, Too?, CNET NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-1035218393.html (“‘. . . the DMCA protects services like YouTube,’ Zahavah Levine, YouTube’s chief
counsel said. ‘With the DMCA, Congress intended to foster online platforms like YouTube, which
empower users, offer new distribution channels for content owners, and respect copyright.’”);
Miguel Helft, Google Takes Step on Video Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/business/16video.html?_r=1 (“Google has long insisted that
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enter Second Level Agreements or implement an identification
technology, the uncertainty surrounding their legal status causes riskaverse players to do more. Given that many analyses in copyright law
involve examination of industry standards, the Second Level
Agreements practice may end up as such standard. Courts may
disapprove UGC platforms that do not engage in Second Level
Agreements, which in turn would generate over-deterrence and
undermine the benefits and positive externalities of UGC. Moreover,
because the large industry players are usually those who enter Second
Level Agreements, smaller UGC platforms may have to face a
prohibitively large wall before enjoying a safe harbor status.
The preceding review aimed at presenting the positive and negative
aspects of Second Level Agreements in theory and in practice. The
following sections strive to set forth the legal and practical implications
of the agreements, and to provide a normative assessment and a careful
predication for their future in the burgeoning reality of the UGC
revolution.
VI. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT,
AND CAREFUL PREDICTION
A.

Legal and Practical Implications

The Second Level Agreements practice has become a common
business model for UGC platforms and copyright owners, as well as the
de-facto regime to determine production and consumption possibilities
for end users in the Web 2.0 era. To fully grasp the significance of the
phenomenon and its potential implications, it is important to analyze it
as a formal legal tool on the one hand, and as an informal norm on the
other hand.
Second Level Agreements are, first and foremost, contractual
agreements between UGC platforms’ operators and copyright owners.
They impose rights and obligations, which are specified in the
contractual terms, on the contracting parties. Although users are
formally bound only by the platforms’ terms of service, these
agreements do impact the users’ legal status. While users who upload
adaptations of preexisting works are technically considered infringers,

YouTube has always operated in compliance with copyright law, in part because it takes down
unauthorized copyrighted clips when asked to by content owners.”).
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Second Level Agreements may provide them with two main defenses:
an implied license claim or an estoppel argument.231
In the leading case for implied copyright license, Effects Associates,
Inc. v. Cohen,232 the court formulated a three-part test for the creation of
an implied nonexclusive license. An implied license would be found
“when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the
creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the
licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee
copy and distribute his work.”233 Obviously users cannot pass this test
based on Second Level Agreements practice, as an interaction between
the licensee and licensor is missing. Nonetheless, in Field v. Google,
Inc., the court stated that an implied license may be found where the
copyright owner’s conduct permits the other party to “properly infer”
that the copyright owner has consented to the other party’s use.234 The
court further held that a copyright holder’s consent does not have to be
manifested verbally, and may be inferred even from silence if she knows
of the use and encourages it.235
The knowledge and encouragement test of Field can be useful in
the hands of platforms users. Whenever a copyright owner enters a
Second Level Agreement, she cannot argue she wasn’t aware of the
users’ use of her work, as the agreement was designed specifically to
clear such uses. Indeed, the clearance was intended to benefit the
platforms, but that does not change the evident existence of the right
holders’ knowledge. As to the encouragement prong, users may argue
that UGC platforms have always motivated users to upload materials,
including copyrighted materials. This encouragement is utterly lawful,
from the platforms’ perspective, thanks to Second Level Agreements,
and may be construed to attribute encouragement to the copyright

231. Additional defenses such as laches and copyright misuse (which is historically related to
the doctrine of “unclean hands”) may also aid users when an infringement suit is brought against
them. A copyright defendant must prove two conjunctive elements to establish a laches defense: (1)
the copyright owner inordinately delayed filing suit although she knew or should have known of the
potential claim and (2) the delay resulted in undue prejudice to the alleged infringer. See Kling v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmty., Inc., 474
F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007). According to the copyright misuse doctrine, the copyright holder’s
own conduct may disqualify her from making any copyright infringement claim during the period of
misuse. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); DSC
Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990).
232. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
233. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002).
234. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006).
235. Id.
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owners. It is apparent, however, that Second Level Agreements do not
perfectly satisfy the requirements for an implied license even under the
broad Field’s test. Yet, as one commentator put it, the implied license
doctrine has always been used to insert some common sense into the
dispute.236 Common sense would probably find a grant of a secondary
license to the platform without an analogous implied license granted to
its users to be preposterous.
Users may also resort to an equitable estoppel defense. Under
copyright law, a copyright owner may be estopped from suing for
copyright infringement if (1) the copyright holder knew of the facts of
defendant’s infringing conduct, (2) either intended that defendant rely on
his acts or omissions or acted or failed to act in such a manner that
defendant had a right to believe it was intended to rely on plaintiff's
conduct, (3) the defendant was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) relied
on the copyright holder’s conduct to his detriment.237 If a copyright
holder sues a user for her allegedly infringing use even though the use
was covered under a valid Second Level Agreement, an estoppel
argument would provide a strong defense. Although the copyright
holder may have not known the facts of the specific infringement, she
gave her permission for similar acts under the agreement. Users can also
argue, justly, that it is reasonable to infer from the vast amount of
copyrighted works, which are not being removed from the platform’s
server, that the copyright owner has intended users to maintain the
practice of uploading such materials. Because informal and industry
practices are often relevant to an estoppel analysis, a claim under this
defense is even stronger.238
The difficulty with the previous discussion is that it seems highly
unlikely that a copyright owner would decide to pursue individual users
for a use covered by a valid Second Level Agreement. This is because,
while formally granting immunity only to platforms’ owners, these
agreements are based on clearing users’ uploads. In reality, the
agreements allow users to create and consume content in a way which
otherwise would have been considered infringing. Therefore, the

236. John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital
Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 898 (2007).
237. Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
238. E.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 2003) (The court held that
because the copyright holder had freely allowed fellow employees to use and modify his
copyrighted worksheet, he was estopped from bringing a copyright infringement claim against
defendant for using the worksheet); Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
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practical significance of Second Level Agreements goes way beyond
their formal legal frame.
In an oft-cited article from 1996, Robert Merges describes versions
of private self-correction that turn into industry norms.239 Merges
discusses the benefits of permitting parties to contract into organizations
governed by liability rules, as a response to a deficiency in the formal
specification of property rights.240
Second Level Agreements
demonstrate Merges’ model in part because they were established as an
alternative system to individual licensing. Nonetheless, there is still a
major difference, which is grounded in the agreements’ unique
character. Second Level Agreements can be classified as collective
licenses because they are intended to allow the use of copyrighted works
by many individual users. Yet, as opposed to the examples brought in
Merges’ work, the licenses are not granted to the users, but to a third
party facilitator. Having said that, Second Level Agreements exemplify
the growth of a norm, which may eventually find its way into formal
legal rules. In the meantime, Second Level Agreements function as the
main regulator of consumption and production by UGC platforms’ users.
Second Level Agreements can also, to some extent, exemplify the
three-dimensional model of property presented by Professor Abraham
Bell and Professor Gideon Parchomovsky.241 Bell and Parchomovsky
argue that property regimes will continue to develop to their optimal
form mainly by reconfiguring assets or adjusting the owner’s panoply of
rights.242 To demonstrate their account in the copyright context, Bell
and Parchomovsky point, inter alia, to the record labels’ abandonment
of the traditional distribution methods (e.g., the music album on vinyl,
tape, or CD) in favor of music online on a pay-per-track basis.243
Second Level Agreements have had a similar effect in terms of changing
the distribution methods and utilizing the advantages of a third party
distributor. The practice also represents a response to what Bell and
Parchomovsky referred to as “evolutionary pressure.”
A slight
adjustment of the copyright owner’s right can be found in the unique
legal arrangement offered by Second Level Agreements—the copyright
owner sells a blanket license to the platform, for the benefit of its users,

239. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1361-62 (1996).
240. Id.
241. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77 (2009).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 93-94.
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but the copyright owner still retains her veto right to ask the removal of
the content, even after the use was made in accordance with the
license.244 In other words, the copyright owner sells some of her rights,
but still has the privilege of denying the license after it has been granted.
Nonetheless, Second Level Agreements do not fit perfectly into the
model as they neither typify a reconfiguration of the asset, nor do they
involve a clear adjustment of the copyright holder’s right. Instead of
offering their works for free (e.g., tolerated use, choosing a creative
commons licensing, etc.) or choosing to litigate, many copyright owners
have decided on a middle ground approach. This compromise
demonstrates a change of the distribution method while the rights and
the asset remain the same.
B.

Normative Assessment

Second Level Agreements herald a new generation of free content
business models, not only for consumption but also for production.
Compared to an ideal copyright world, there are obviously too many
shortcomings. However, upon juxtaposing the flaws described above to
the benefits the agreements bestow on the various parties, Second Level
Agreements do more good than evil by promoting better information
consumption, greater expression production, and broader infringement
avoidance.
That said, the legal regime created by Second Level Agreements
could still be improved to offer more benefits and fewer drawbacks.
Before discussing possible improvements, two comments are due. First,
many of the disadvantages discussed are grounded in the nature of
copyright law, which is based primarily on property rules. Under
property rules “[n]o one can take the entitlement to private property
from the holder unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at
which he [or she] subjectively values the property.”245 A copyright
owner enjoys the ability to grant a license and demand any price she
finds appropriate to compensate her for the use. She can also, however,
refuse to grant a permission to use her work. Some of the setbacks of

244. This bears some resemblance to Glen O. Robinson’s model of unilateral use restrictions as
covenants that run with the property. The copyright owner succeeds in imposing post-transfer
restrictions. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1480
(2004). The difference is that naming the copyright owner’s right to deny the use after the license is
granted “a post transfer restriction” would be an understatement of the word “restriction.” It is not a
restriction but a complete, unpredicted denial or withdrawal.
245. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972).
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Second Level Agreements, like non-inclusiveness and vulnerability, are
products of this proprietary regime and would be present in any
alternative, unless copyright owners no longer retain their veto right.
Second, when judging the Second Level Agreements phenomenon,
one should be mindful of the backdrop against which it has developed.
The DMCA was criticized by many commentators for providing an
inadequate solution for the challenges posed by the digital age.246 At
least some of the criticism has proven to be right, as alternative ways of
dealing with these challenges—such as Second Level Agreements—
have emerged. Yet, Second Level Agreements represent a compromised
stopgap, and thus cannot entirely alter the legal framework, or provide a
comprehensive alternative to deficiencies in current copyright law. One
shouldn’t ask therefore whether this practice is perfect, but whether
copyright owners, platforms, users, and society as a whole are better off
under a Second Level Agreements regime.
As Second Level
Agreements allow a new market of mass production to prosper, rather
than being shut down due to market failures, I believe the answer is yes.
Yet, Second Level Agreements can be revamped if some of their
imperfections would be addressed. Following the words of Justice Louis
D. Brandeis—“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”247—alleviating the
opacity would be a good start. Besides scaling off the detrimental
educational effect and the uncertainty surrounding the users’ legal status,
transparency will also help to cure other flaws in the Second Level
Agreements regime, as it will bring the pacts to the center of attention,
and expose them to public criticism and even pressure in case an
unjustified arrangement took place. This can be done through a statutory
requirement to fully disclose the terms of Second Level Agreements.
Such a course, however, is at odds with freedom of contract because it
imposes an unreasonable obligation on the contracting parties, especially
when these parties are private corporations legitimately wishing to hide
their business practices and trade secrets from the public eye. It is also
possible that the opacity of Second Level Agreements is a precondition
for their existence as copyright owners wish not to grant any legal rights
in their works to users. While such a contention may have been viable at
the emergence of the practice, it is not very likely to be true nowadays,
as the practice itself has already altered the users’ legal status and will
246. E.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673, 739-40 (2000); Urban & Quilter, supra note 96; Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 157 (2005/2006).
247. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/3

48

Lev-Aretz: Second Level Agreements

8- LEVARETZ MACRO FINAL.DOCM

2012]

2/24/2012 9:30 AM

SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS

185

keep doing so even more vigorously in the future as a rooted industry
norm.
Another alternative is to initiate a legal prerequisite for Second
Level Agreements, which will require the contracting parties to provide
a written statement as to the legal rights and obligations of users under
the pact. This statement would comprehensively describe the boundaries
for users’ production as well as the users’ legal status. The statement
would also indicate the duration of the agreement and the legal state of
users and their works in case the agreement won’t be renewed. In
addition, the parties would be obliged to publicly announce the details of
this statement, and platforms would have to incorporate a link to such
statements in their terms of use. The power to enforce this obligation
could be bestowed on the Copyright office, which upon receiving a
complaint from a user, will be authorized to employ various sanctions,
e.g., imposing fines.
Due to the perceived shift towards standardization of Second Level
Agreements and the increasing deployment of filtering technologies, the
over-filtering problem must also be addressed to the extent possible.
Indeed, the need to employ filtering technologies to make the process of
identifying infringements is understandable. Filtering systems protect
UGC platforms and provide a workable environment for copyright
owners, end users, and platforms’ operators. Over-filtering, however, is
an undesirable byproduct of this system which, as explained earlier,
circumvents the DMCA counter-notification process. Thus, while the
use of identification technologies ought to be allowed, platforms must be
required whenever a copyright owner asks for the removal of content in
the case of a system-match, to allow users to oppose the removal
through counter-notification. YouTube already follows this model, and
epitomizes a sincere attempt to compromise the need to employ filtering
mechanism with users’ legal rights.
Additionally, notwithstanding their merits, Second Level
Agreements cannot and should not utterly substitute First Level
Agreements. The current state in which non-commercial licensing exists
virtually is, only in theory, fundamentally wrong. Users should be able
to employ copyrighted work irrespective of a Second Level Agreement’s
presence. Second Level Agreements’ non-inclusiveness would have less
severe implications if alternative individual licensing practices exist. As
I will demonstrate later, the shift towards premium content and reduction
of derivative UGC reinforces the need for a non-commercial licensing
regime. A non-commercial licensing system would result in a win-win
situation, in which users, copyright owners, and society as a whole
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benefit; innovative users would be able to pay a reasonable price for
using a copyrighted work, copyright owners would employ another
revenue source, and the amount of creative expression would escalate.
The previous discussion suggested that the practice of Second
Level Agreements is overall desirable. Nonetheless, the UGC market is
faced with ongoing changes, which are expected to influence, inter alia,
the practice of Second Level Agreements. As demonstrated above, the
practice has already gone through some changes when agreements
became more standard, employing filtering technologies as an integral
part of them. The growing demand for premium content and the
declining attractiveness of UGC for potential advertisers also implies a
different Second Level Agreements practice in the future. The latest
court ruling in the case of Viacom v. Google may affect the practice of
Second Level Agreements as well.
The move towards
disintermediation, encouraged by the Internet, may likewise impact the
future of UGC platforms and the Second Level Agreements practice.
Also, the recent initiation of the first non-commercial licensing platform
may herald additional developments of the non-commercial licensing
scheme, and accordingly may impact the Second Level Agreements
practice. In the next and last section, I analyze these influential factors
and provide a careful prediction as to the future of copyrights in the
digital realm.
C.

The Future of Second Level Agreements248
i) The Growing Demand for Premium Content

When the first Second Level Agreements were signed, it seemed
like a perfect arrangement—utilizing advertising revenue to enable users
to upload copyrighted content. As previously shown, however, UGC
has become less attractive to advertisers, who seek “safe” premium
content to attach to their ads. Consequently, platforms have realized that
in order to turn themselves into better revenue generators, they must

248. Another two factors that could influence the future of Second Level Agreements are the
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of
2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) (also known as the Protect IP Act of 2011) (recommended to be
considered by the whole Senate) and the Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011)
(also known as SOPA) (introduced). If passed, these acts could significantly impact UGC websites,
as copyright infringement would become remarkably risky for end-users and service providers.
These bills are still undergoing major changes and redrafting, and it is hard to determine the extent
to which they alter the Second Level Agreements practice. For this reason, this Article does not
discuss their potential effects on the Second Level Agreements practice.
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either enhance UGC residing on their servers with premium content, or
adhere to the premium content model and refrain from hosting UGC.
YouTube, for example, lost approximately $470 million in 2009 as the
costs of bandwidth and storage far exceeded its revenue from
advertising.249 Since then, YouTube has been trying to transform from
an online clutter of amateur videos to a mainstream host of TV programs
and movies by adding more premium content.250 While YouTube keeps
demonstrating its obligation to the maintenance of UGC, few platforms
could endure years of financial losses for the ideal of making their users
happy.251 For this reason, some platforms turned from hosting UGC and
premium content to offering merely the latter. Other websites were
initiated on the premium content model, and abandoned UGC uploads as
a traffic generator under the belief that some advertisers are ambivalent
to hosting advertising on a website alongside UGC.252
The move towards premium content has already affected Second
Level Agreements and is expected to maintain its influence in the future.
Indeed, bandwidth costs as well as storage costs are declining. From
$270 in 1998, the cost of streaming a movie over the Internet dropped to
merely five cents today.253 Still, as the rate of uploaded UGC has grown
immensely in the past decade, the decreasing costs of storage and
bandwidth are not necessarily reflected in practice to a full extent. Thus,
a business model that involves offering UGC along with premium
content (akin to the YouTube model) can be proven unprofitable. As
one commentator put it, “imagine a store where you stock thousands of
items, but only 5 percent of them are ever sold. That’s YouTube.”254
For the reasons described above, the move towards premium
content is expected to continue. A direct consequence would be
249. Stelter & Helft, supra note 146.
250. Greg Sterling, YouTube Moves: Google TV Ads And More Premium Content, Search
Engine Land, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Apr. 17, 2009), http://searchengineland.com/youtubes-futuretvads-and-more-premium-content-17723.
251. Eric E. Schmidt, Google’s chief executive, said in an interview that YouTube would
continue to embrace user created content, even if it was not easy to earn revenue from it, because
that content was essential to the popularity of the site. See Stelter & Helft, supra note 146.
252. Greg Sandoval, Universal, YouTube near deal on music video site, CNET NEWS (Mar. 4,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10188600-93.html?tag=mncol;title. See also VEVO,
http://www.vevo.com/.
253. Dan Rayburn, Bandwidth Pricing Trends: Cost To Stream A Movie Today, Five Cents: In
1998,
$270,
BUSINESS
OF
VIDEO.COM
BLOG
(Jan.
6,
2010),
http://blog.streamingmedia.com/the_business_of_online_vi/2010/01/bandwidth-pricing-trends-costto-stream-a-movie-today-five-cents-cost-in-1998-270.html.
254. R. Scott Raynovich, The YouTube Model is Dead, CONTENTINOPLE (July 4, 2009),
available at http://www.webvideomarketing.org/fullarticle.html?id=1911 (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
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decreasing engagement in Second Level Agreements, as opposed to
premium content partnerships, of major UGC platforms. Because
Second Level Agreements are sensitive to market changes, some of the
current agreements would be terminated or modified to include premium
content only. Current UGC platforms may also turn into premium
content platforms, thus leaving the UGC market in the hands of smaller
websites. So far, however, Second Level Agreements have been present
only in major UGC platforms. Unless this changes, a complete shift to
premium content and the domination of the UGC market by smaller
platforms would have a significant influence over the prospects of
Second Level Agreements, and the amount of authorized UGC on the
Internet.
YouTube is currently the leading platform for UGC, and as long as
it follows its statements to embrace user created content, UGC will stay
around, along with the practice of Second Level Agreements. While
many have predicted the demise of the “You” in YouTube, based on the
apparent shift towards premium content, so far none of them were
right.255 Not only that, although advertisers favor premium content over
UGC, there is still an ample demand among users for UGC platforms to
share and communicate with others. The market is expected to satisfy
this demand by creating more UGC platforms and augmenting existing
UGC networks. Second Level Agreements, then, could be based on the
ad share revenue model, depending on advertisers that wish to capitalize
on the traffic on a website, irrespective of the content generating it.
Alternatively, platforms and copyright owners may utilize royalty
payments, although this course is unlikely to be sustainable with no
revenue source for the platforms to justify the payment of royalties.
Platforms could also profit from offering complementary goods, such as
downloadable songs, t-shirts, DVDs, photos, concerts tickets, etc., and
share the earnings with copyright owners as part of a Second Level
Agreement.
Although difficult to implement after offering the
platforms’ services for free, charging end-users for uploading their
materials could also provide some revenue source for platforms, and
may enable them to financially enter Second Level Agreements.
Until a successful alternative to the ad revenue share model is
found, the practice of Second Level Agreements is jeopardized. Pending

255. E.g., id.; Sela, supra note 144; Chris Albrecht, Will Premium Content Kill the “You” in
YouTube?, NEW TEEVEE (Mar. 30, 2009), http://newteevee.com/2009/03/30/will-premium-contentkill-the-you-in-youtube/.
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court’s rulings, however, may still allow it to flourish, as I show in the
next section.
ii) The Viacom Ruling
Many interested parties closely watched the three-year-old legal
battle between Viacom and YouTube, as it has pitted powerful
Hollywood studios against equally dominant technology giants.
Although the filing of the lawsuit has revealed the great tension between
UGC platforms and media companies over copyrights, this tension has
subsided substantially with time, due in large part to the rise of Second
Level Agreements and the use of identification technologies to detect
infringing content. Because Viacom appealed the decision, it is
important to consider the possible effects of both the current decision
and a potential adverse ruling on the practice of Second Level
Agreements.
The holding in Viacom places the onus of policing copyright
infringement squarely on the shoulders of copyright owners. The court
concluded that:
If a service provider knows of specific instances of infringement, the
provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the
burden is on the owner to identify the infringement. General
knowledge that infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on
the service provider to monitor or search its service for
infringements.256

The decision means that UGC platforms are not legally required to
develop filtering systems and would enjoy a safe harbor status as long as
they took down content when copyright holders complained. The Veoh
appellate court recently echoed this approach, by holding that the
DMCA did not impose investigative obligations on service providers.257
The current decision dramatically improved the bargaining position
of UGC platforms’ owners in negotiating Second Level Agreements.
Before outlining the ramifications of this upgrade, it is important to
distinguish small UGC platforms and small copyright owners from their
major counterparts. Small UGC platforms are only marginally affected
by this ruling, which shields them from liability had they followed the
court’s clear interpretation of the DMCA. In practical terms, small
256. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis
added).
257. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2011).
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platforms would probably remain an unattractive contractual party for
major copyright owners. Thus, no Second Level Agreements are
expected to appear as far as these platforms are involved. Small
copyright holders are even less affected by the ruling, as they have been
virtually absent from the Second Level Agreements practice. Except for
monetizing their content in platforms that enable them to do so (what
may sometimes qualify as Second Level Agreements), these copyright
owners would continue to do what they have always done—monitor the
Web and send takedown notifications, or tolerate the use.
Conversely, major UGC platforms and powerful content owners
would be greatly affected by the outcome of this case. While the current
ruling is expected to encourage copyright owners to replace constant
monitoring of UGC platforms for infringing content with content
partnerships, the demands for the latter would probably increase. If the
decision were to be reversed on appeal, the same effect is presumed on
copyright holders; UGC platforms would have a stronger motivation to
enter content partnerships while copyright owners are likely to augment
their demands. If the current ruling will be upheld on appeal, the pivotal
question would be whether UGC platforms insist on getting more than
right holders agree to grant, which in turn may cause negotiation
breakdown and threaten the Second Level Agreements practice. It is
more likely, however, that such a scenario would not take place for
several reasons. First, the current Viacom ruling is subject to appellate
review and may be overturned. UGC platforms and content owners are
aware of this fact and will not dramatically change their strategies until a
final judgment is delivered. Second, even if the ruling is affirmed on
appeal, it is in the interest of both parties to work in tandem because they
stand to gain from a content partnership. UGC platforms could utilize
copyrighted materials to increase traffic on their websites, offer creative
users informal permission to use copyrighted content in their works, and
employ premium content to attract advertisers and increase revenues.
Also, given the importance of hosting copyrighted materials to their
prosperity, UGC platforms have always been keen to maintaining a good
relationship with content owners.258 As previously discussed, copyright
owners are also better off under a valid Second Level Agreement, which
allows them to save enforcement costs and to enjoy the platforms’
marketing potential. Because Second Level Agreements enable UGC
258. One of the problems with the Viacom case is that to a large extent it addressed past
conduct—Viacom sought damages only for actions taking place before YouTube implemented its
content ID in early 2008. As discussed above, the conditions of the market have tremendously
changed since three years ago with the rise of Second Level Agreements and content partnerships.
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platforms and copyright holders to retain the advantages as described,
they are facially expected to maintain it.
iii) Disintermediation
The development of the Internet has been shown to shorten
processes and eliminate intermediaries.259 This disintermediation has
not skipped the media companies, which have often chosen to launch
their own platform for distribution instead of partnering with existing
platforms. Hulu, a web-based commercial-supported site, which
operates cooperatively with NBC Universal and a number of other major
American networks, follows this model.260 Another relatively new
example is Vevo, a premium content portal owned by Universal Music
Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and the Abu Dhabi Media
Company.261 The disintermediation move could impact UGC practice
too, as powerful content owners may start employing their own
technologies to monitor the Web and send automated takedown notices
in case a match is found. Additionally, they could establish distribution
platforms for their premium content to attract Internet users from current
UGC and premium content platforms. Such development could be
destructive to UGC platforms and possibly bring the Second Level
Agreements practice to an end.
Yet, a complete disintermediation is unlikely to occur as several
current indications imply. Above all, history proves that technology has
always preceded industry practice and business models, which had to be
adjusted duly. For this reason, platforms owned and operated by techsavvy intermediaries are still dominant and would probably continue to
prevail.262 Even if copyright owners would manage to acquire
technology to effectively monitor the Web and send takedown notices,
such technology would expose them to liability for misrepresentation
under §512(f) of the DMCA. §512(f) was intended to provide an
economic disincentive to remove non-infringing material.263 When a

259. Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397 (2009).
260. HULU, http://www.hulu.com.
261. Although the video hosting for Vevo is provided by YouTube, with Google and Vevo
sharing the advertising revenue.
262. See, for example, current talks about Google’s plan to launch a music service to compete
with Apple’s iTunes store. Scott Morrison, Google Plans Music Service Tied to Search Engine,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(June
21,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704895204575321560516305040.html.
263. Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown/Put back Provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 316 (2010).
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copyright owner sends a takedown notice, “knowingly materially
misrepresents” that the content in question infringes her copyright, the
alleged infringer has a claim for damages incurred and may seek
monetary relief.264 One court recently concluded that under the DMCA,
copyright owners must consider the fair use doctrine in determining
whether to issue a takedown notice.265 As opposed to the current
operation of filtering systems, which bypasses this DMCA obligation by
removing the content automatically prior to its upload, technology
employed by content owners without platforms’ cooperation would
involve regular DMCA procedure, and thus would have to comply with
the requirements set forth in §512(f). As I explained earlier, although
technical approximations provide some degree of certainty, they are not
capable of identifying all fair uses. Copyright owners are therefore
expected to face a serious dilemma if they choose to employ such
technologies without the platforms’ safeguarding hand.
Another reason for copyright owners and UGC platforms not to
part ways has to do with the popularity of UGC among both usersproviders and users-consumers. Users demand to post and consume
amateur content, and they vote with their feet.266 Studies that analyzed
UGC platforms’ popularity found that UGC allows users to attain three
groups of needs virtually all together: (a) self-expression and selfactualization, (b) social interaction and community development, and (c)
information and entertainment.267 The importance of fulfilling many
needs in one convenient location has created a high demand for UGC
networks. While copyright owners can provide the need for information
and entertainment, the combination of satisfying users’ informational
wants, providing entertainment (not only premium entertainment), and
enabling social connections requires more than a premium content
platform. UGC, thus, seems to call for cooperation between content
owners and platforms to maintain its appealing qualities.

264. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
265. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
266. UGC videos keep generating the largest number of views. See, e.g., Relaxnews,
YouTube’s most-watched videos of the week, THE INDEPENDENT (May 21, 2010),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/youtubes-mostwatched-videos-of-the-week1979790.html (listing the ten most viewed YouTube videos for that week, from which eight were
user-created videos).
267. Guosong Shao, Understanding the appeal of user-generated media: a uses and
gratification perspective, 19 INTERNET RESEARCH 1, 7 (2009). See also Ivan B. Dylko, What is
Politics-Oriented UGC?, TECH, MEDIA AND POLITICS BLOG (May 13, 2009),
http://ivandylko.blogspot.com/2009/05/what-is-politics-oriented-ugc.html.
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A relatively new form of intermediation, however, threatens the
Second Level Agreements practice. After preforming successfully in the
UK, a digital rights management company, Base 79 (previously—“My
Video Rights”),268 sought to bring its model to the U.S. market, and
started offering technology to monitor unauthorized usage of
copyrighted materials in web videos.269 When a copyright infringement
is found through the monitoring technology, the copyright owner may
earn income from the infringement in the form of advertising, which is
then placed next to the infringing video.270 While the technology
resembles YouTube’s Content ID system, unlike this system, this
business model leaves UGC platforms out of the game and takes ad
revenue away from them.271
The choice to monitor the web
independently discourages right holders from entering Second Level
Agreements in their current form, as it provides a monetization
alternative for the entire web and does not require individual negotiation
with each platform. Also, as long as independent monitoring results in
monetization, as oppose to removal, of infringing content, rightholders
are shielded from liability under §512(f) of the DMCA. Consequently,
independent monitoring may be a game changer for the Second Level
Agreements regime.
iv) Non-Commercial Licensing Practice272
As mentioned before, in the absence of a Second Level Agreement,
a user-provider wishing to make a derivative use of a work has basically
four options—avoiding the use because the copyright owner would
probably demand its removal; using the work in compliance with the fair
use doctrine; taking more than the fair use doctrine allows and hoping
the copyright owner tolerates the use; or obtaining permission for

268. Base 79, BASE 79, http://www.base79.com/#!home.
269. James Careless, MyVideoRights Thinks Big as it Expands Into the U.S., STREAMING
MEDIA
MAGAZINE
(April/May
2011),
http://www.streamingmedia.com/Articles/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=74798&utm_source=feedbur
ner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+StreamingMediaMagazineFeaturedArticles+(StreamingMedia.com:+Featured+Articles) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
270. Id.
271. My Video Rights’ Chief Operating Officer, Ron Schneier, describes the process: “For
instance, rather than remove a popular clip from YouTube so that no one can see it, we replace it
with a higher quality version that provides a better viewing experience and makes money from
advertising, i.e., through a short commercial preroll before the content is shown or a midroll of ads
during the content itself.” Id.
272. This section is based on a work by the author of this article—Yafit Lev-Aretz, Towards a
Non-Commercial Licensing Practice (on file with the author).
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employing the copyrighted content. To be on the safe side, the user has
to choose between refraining from using the copyrighted work, or
obtaining a license from the copyright holder. Although copyright law
aims at encouraging the second choice, so that creation of new
expressions would expand, in practice users are markedly discouraged
from taking that path.
A user-producer’s journey towards acquiring a license starts with
identifying the copyright holder. While the Internet made such a quest
much easier, in some cases it is still not at all simple, especially when
the copyrighted work is not a popular one. If the user succeeds in
identifying the copyright owner, she would have to contact the owner to
negotiate a license. All these actions are time-consuming and may
involve expenditure on top of the license’s costs, which may render the
transaction inefficient to complete.273 Moreover, since currently there is
no common practice of licensing for non-commercial purposes, a user is
usually required to pay a pricy licensing fee, which she cannot afford as
a private user.274 The difficulty is greater when the requested license is
for the use of a popular work.275 Previous cases demonstrated that the
copyright industries have been reluctant to provide no-cost or reducedprice licenses for non-profit and non-commercial uses.276 As Professor
Neil Netanel pointed out, this state makes perfect economic sense for the

273. For example, see the following question asked by a YouTube user on the YouTube Help
forum:
I wanted to make a video to accompany a piece of music . . . soon after uploading the
video I was informed that the audio would be disabled because I had violated
copyrighted material from ‘WMG’ . . . The disabling of the music made the video
nonsensical . . . So, I finally decided to do something about it by finding out who had the
rights to the song and legally get permission . . . I searched for a couple of days and
came up empty handed . . . The next logical step was using the ‘Contact Us’ portion of
the Warner Music Group website . . . Now each time I wanted to contact them I had to
fill in a form—I did this quite a number of times over a two-month period and never
received a response. I came across a site that said it would contact people on your behalf
to get rights to use music, movies, etc., and give you a quote for the cost so you could
legally get the rights . . . So I regularly contacted this company over a two-month period
again having to fill in a form each time—and I never received a response. So I have hit a
brick wall and would like to know what the next logical step would be in trying to get
permission to use this song? Or, at the very least, a response from a human?
Vercingetorix, Posted How to Gain Copyright Permission?, YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Aug. 16,
2009), http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=48e112ea6309599c&hl=en.
274. Gervais, supra note 4, at 848.
275. Michal Shur-Ofry, Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 525,
549-52 (2010) (describing the potentials of market failure in the process of licensing popular
works).
276. Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 79 (2003).
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copyright industry firm, as “at some point the costs of setting and
administering differential pricing outweigh the revenues the firm can
expect to reap from such a regime.”277
Still, the demand for a non-commercial licensing system keeps
growing. Online forums are saturated with users’ posts concerning the
same issue—an obtainment of a license to use a copyrighted work.278
While Second Level Agreements have considerably promoted the needs
of users-providers, as users become more productive and their works
gain more popularity, the agreements’ non-inclusiveness becomes a
major hurdle. Although quite belatedly, companies have started to
recognize this demand and the first non-commercial licensing
mechanism was launched recently. The initiative came from Google’s
YouTube and Music licensing store RumbleFish, which announced the
launch of Friendly Music, an online store designed to help users find
appropriate soundtrack music for their videos.279 The service offers
users to purchase a perpetual synchronization license to a copyrighted
song for $1.99. Under the license, users are allowed to use the song as
part of the audio track of one video that they may upload to UGC
networks for non-commercial purposes only.280 The license agreement
requires users not to get paid for making the video, not to charge anyone
for watching it, and not to receive revenue from advertising or other
sources.281
Friendly Music is merely a start and is still far from fulfilling the
current demand for non-commercial licenses. Nevertheless, Friendly
Music marks the first time users-providers, acting within a mass creation
platform, enjoy the option to obtain a direct non-commercial license
without UGC platforms’ involvement. Prior to the inception of the
Second Level Agreements practice, users-providers could not legally
acquire a license and had to either avoid using the copyrighted work or
turn the use into a commercial one so they would be able to negotiate
277. Id.
278. E.g., the aforementioned “Vercingetorix” post. Vercingetorix, supra note 273. See also
Ron, Posted How do you get permission to use copyrighted material?, YAHOO (June 2, 2010),
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100503054515AALTElx; Cheeky0Little0Gamer,
Posted how do i get permission to use a song in my video? Ive got the cd!, GOOGLE (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=2408bf1732b89c01&hl=en.
279. FRIENDLY MUSIC, http://www.friendlymusic.com.
280. Friendly
Music
License
Agreement,
FRIENDLY
MUSIC,
http://www.friendlymusic.com/docs/friendly-music-license-agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
281. Other than UGC platform’s ad share revenue on the video portion of the work. In case
users wish to employ the music for commercial purposes, they would have the option to contact the
service and negotiate an additional license fee. See id.
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and pay the expensive license fee. Under Second Level Agreements,
users-providers were able to create more freely, but still pursuant to an
indirect license, unknown terms, and full dependence on the copyright
holders’ will. A non-commercial licensing practice takes this state to the
next level by enabling creative users to acquire a direct license, with
fully disclosed terms and little room for surprises.
The truly interesting question would be to what extent, if at all, this
practice would affect Second Level Agreements. From the right
holders’ perspective, it all comes down to the profitability of each
model. The non-commercial licensing model is likely to be less
successful, at least in its first years. Making popular works available for
non-commercial licensing, demanding users to pay for such use after
enjoying it for free for many years now, offering a non-commercial
licensing mechanism in other UGC fields, and creating a more appealing
licensing structure that allows users to apply more creative changes to
the original work—all are developments that entail time and
expenditures. If a non-commercial licensing system would manage to
overcome the aforementioned difficulties, it would offer copyright
owners a more comprehensive scheme for charging users, without
subjecting the charge to the interests of other players (e.g., UGC
platforms and advertisers).
Until then, however, Second Level
Agreements are expected to remain the favored licensing option for
copyright holders.
For creative users, Second Level Agreements, regardless of their
vulnerability and non-inclusiveness, make more economical sense. As
opposed to the iTunes model which offered a reasonably priced
alternative to the illegal conduct of file sharing, a non-commercial
licensing system would have to compete with legitimate licenses, which
on top of being lawfully made are completely free. The free license
alternative leaves little incentive for users to engage in a noncommercial licensing practice.
Also, ironically, Second Level
Agreements in their current form are better for creative users because
these pacts allow creation without imposing preliminary restrictions. As
long as Second Level Agreements continue to offer users a
complimentary, restrictions-free license, non-commercial licenses will
operate as a form of insurance. When a user purchases a noncommercial license, she can be certain that her work is legally produced
and distributed, thus not conditional on right holders’ caprices. Still, it
seems that for the vast majority of users, the benefit of this insurance
exceeds its price. Users are expected to be risk seeking because they
only risk the presence of their work on the platform, which can be easily
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restored through a non-commercial license in case the copyright owner
demands its removal. Until Second Level Agreements cease to afford a
better alternative for most users, the relatively low number of risk averse
users who would choose to pay for a formal license as insurance is
unlikely to maintain sufficient demand to keep non-commercial
licensing thriving.
It is hard to determine whether a non-commercial licensing system
would better survive in copyright practice than Second Level
Agreements. In the only current form of the non-commercial licensing
system, one dominant UGC platform actively participated in establishing
the system. Thus, this platform is expected to actively promote itself
among its users. When a user obtains a non-commercial license, she
also immunizes the platform from secondary liability, because the user
has the legal right to post the content. In such case, the platform can
stipulate in its terms of service that it reserves the right to attach
advertisements to users’ works.282 Shifting the licensing burden to users
would also release platforms owners from including derivative UGC in
Second Level Agreements, thus making the agreements more beneficial
and presumably less expensive for the platforms. Because UGC has
already proven itself as a poor interest for advertisers, platform operators
are better off without bearing financial and legal responsibility for
licensing such uses.
Non-commercial licensing also opens the market for another kind
of intermediary, which may eat into the current UGC platform’s scope of
operation. However, Friendly Music’s business model implies that
Second Level Agreements may end up incorporating non-commercial
licensing systems, which will be operated by the platforms themselves.
It is still for the platforms to resolve how an automated filtering system
could automatically distinguish between premium content, which may or
may not be covered under content partnership, and authorized derivative
UGC pursuant to a non-commercial license.
In light of this analysis, one has to give thought to two important
points. First, if built appropriately, a non-commercial licensing scheme
is the ideal way of operating in the copyright market. A direct, clear,
and certain license provides better and more efficient creation
opportunities, and thus promotes the underpinning of copyright law.
Second, the current non-commercial licensing attempt has sprung from a
market demand, which kept growing, notwithstanding the presence of
Second Level Agreements.
This makes perfect sense when
282. Although this may conflict with the “non-commercial” requirement of the license.
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understanding the grounds on which Second Level Agreements
emerged—a sudden reality of mass creation and user-supplied content,
statutory safe harbors for UGC platforms, and lack of a feasible way to
charge users for their employment of copyrighted works. Against this
backdrop, it almost appears as though Second Level Agreements were
the only quick and efficient substitute for a non-commercial license that
the market could come up with. Therefore, non-commercial licensing is
expected to develop and naturally undermine its antecedent, although
such subversion will take time to complete. In the meanwhile, Second
Level Agreements and non-commercial licensing are expected to overlap
until finding the appropriate allocation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Second Level Agreements have changed the landscape of copyright
practice. Formally, Second Level Agreements are meant to limit the
potential liability of UGC platform operators, while having no direct
bearing on the legal status of end users. In practice, however, Second
Level Agreements have dramatically affected the rights and privileges of
end users. Effectively, they have dramatically expanded consumption
and use possibilities, and have afforded users far greater access and use
privileges with respect to copyrighted content relative to what they
previously had. Hence, it will not be an exaggeration to say that in terms
of practical significance, Second Level Agreements are far more
important than fair use and tolerated use.
Second Level Agreements are ubiquitous, especially among large
UGC platforms. Websites, such as YouTube, MySpace, and Yahoo, to
name just a few, have all entered Second Level Agreements with
powerful right holders, such as the big four U.S. record labels, Viacom,
Disney, and others. As a result, Second Level Agreements redefined not
only the legal rights and duties of the contracting parties, but also the
prevailing norms and industry practices, which regulate the creation and
distribution of UGC.
The goal in this article was to provide a first comprehensive study
of the Second Level Agreements phenomenon. Descriptively, it presents
a detailed account of the emergence of Second Level Agreements as
well as their effects. Normatively, it evaluates the vices and virtues of
Second Level Agreements. It also offers a prediction as to the future of
Second Level Agreements.
Despite the immense practical significance of Second Level
Agreements and the theoretical challenges they raise, legal scholarship
has not provided a thorough analysis of their regime. This article
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attempts to redress this omission. It is my hope that this study will
constitute a useful first step for future research on the subject.
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